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Abstract   
Conflicts undermine state security, cause massive loss of lives, destroy livelihoods and 
undermine the general well-being of civilian populations. DDR has thus become the foremost 
policy tool for securing state security and establishing the framework for reconstructing 
conflict-affected societies.   
Using Liberia as a case, the present study has explored the livelihoods of ex-combatants 
within the framework of the UN-led DDR Program. Re-integrating ex-combatants into civil, 
productive and institutional life is the expected end result of the DDR Program. 
This led to the use of three main concepts; human security, human development and 
reconciliation. These three concepts provided the basis for assessing the success of the DDR 
Program in Liberia, with empirical focus on the ex-combatants‟ livelihoods in Monrovia.  
The study then found that most of the ex-combatants were unemployed; they had no stable 
sources of income and place to live. They were using illegal means such as armed robbery and 
criminal gang banditry to support themselves. The DDR failed to help prepare and reintegrate 
the ex-combatants into civilian life. The program also failed in making the ex-fighters 
responsible members of their communities despite the time and resources used for the 
program. Improving the human security of those directly involved in the conflict was an 
important way to bring development to the local communities, and to also reconcile 
perpetrators with their victims.  
The DDR Program in Liberia appeared to have had its own administrative problems, 
including funding. These problems strongly may have affected its operations, especially in 
providing alternative and legitimate sources of income for the ex-combatants. This is because 
a mass of unemployed and disgruntled ex-fighters can seriously undermine post-conflict 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the international community led by United Nations, has taken 
many steps in securing peace in many post-conflict nations through DDR (Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration) programs. Providing sustainable post-war livelihoods for 
ex-combatants and their families is the key component of DDR programs (UN-DDR 2010).  
  
1.1.1 Intra-States Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
For the past decades and on, intra-state conflicts, like those in West Africa (Sierra Leone, 
Cote d‟Ivoire and Liberia), and regional conflicts, like those of the Great Lakes Region in 
central Africa (countries bordering Lake Victoria and Tanganyika) have ruined Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Ross 2005). This has led to millions of deaths, displaced many people, created cross-
border refugees, and led to gross human rights abuses (Akokpari 1999). Because of these 
conflicts, people living in these areas are faced with the lack of access to proper human 
security and social development. 
Intra-state conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa constitutes nearly half of global conflicts that have 
occurred for the past three decades (Carment and Schnabel 2003). Examples include: the 
genocide of Rwanda‟s ethnic cleansing in the mid 1990s; Sierra Leone‟s indiscriminate 
killings and amputation of limbs of civilians in the early 1990s; the conflict in Cote D‟Ivoire; 
the renowned killing fields in the DR Congo; Somalia‟s political instability, and Uganda‟s 
continual civil war (Akokpari 1999).  
 
1.1.2 Securitizing Post-Conflict Society through DDR Programs   
The introduction of DDR in post intra-state conflict is far more rewarding nowadays, but there 
are lots of challenges that lie in this corridor to security stabilization. DDR programs ensure 
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political stability, social economic development, security, sustainable development and rule of 
law. These are the expected outcomes when DDR is fully implemented. 
Combatants are the central focus in order to ensure a stable secure environment for post-war 
peace building; therefore, by introducing DDR, and implementing every component of the 
program efficiently can provide the enabling environment for peace building. The most 
important thing about DDR is not just the collection of guns, or reintegration of ex-fighters 
into civilian lives, but mainly transforming them into law abiding citizens. That is preparing 
them as people who are able and capable of earning a living legitimately as expected of every 
member of society. There are some ex-combatants who may be eligible or qualified for police 
or the army job after completing the DDR, and if these ex-combatants are re-enlisted into 
these security apparatus, they may have not been re-settled or reintegrated as civilians, but as 
law abiding citizens and officers, which is also a boost to post-war recovery.   
Dealing with ex-fighters in the aftermath of war is a difficult task in peace building process. 
To demilitarize fighting groups that have used guns as the major means of earning a living 
during war time is far challenging than easily thought (Muggah 2009). Ex-combatants in West 
Africa‟s trouble spots (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast) during the war collected tens of 
thousands of dollars from looting, armed robbery and trade of illicit gem stones (Ross 2005). 
Those ex-combatants are now receiving little amount of money per month from DDR 
reinsertion package. The vast drop in such earnings usually creates serious problem to keep 
these ex-fighters in the DDR program for long period of time.  Ex-combatants are used to 
extorting huge amounts of money through illegal means at the expense of others, which they 
would like to continue doing even during postwar era. During war time, just take any other 
conflict zone in Africa as an example; let say Sierra Leone. A fighter could just point an AK-
47 at your head and take away all your life long earnings in minutes (Muggah 2009). Now it 
is the DDR responsibility to provide an alternative means through which these spoiled ex-
combatants can earn a living legitimately. These alternative means are not just to provide 
means of earning a living, but mainly to prevent the ex-combatants from engaging in illegal 
activities that have the potential to undermine national security and the post word 
reconstruction.   
Building a secure society, preventing recurrence of conflict, restoring rule of law and kick 
starting developmental initiatives in the aftermath of war are the leading objectives of UN 
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humanitarian intervention (UN 2010). The foundation upon which a success of peace building 
mission can be built in order to achieve peace during post-war reconstruction is the DDR. 
Evidence abound that wherever DDR had failed, there has not been sustainable peace. This is 
evident in the DR Congo, Afghanistan and even the 1994-1995 failed DDR in Liberia, which 
resulted in renewed fighting from 1998 to 2003 (Pietz 2004). The point here is that DDR is 
now the tool for international peace building in the aftermath of war. DDR is very relevant for 
peace building, but the cost that comes with it is practically high; that is why dedication and 
adequate funding are very important for the DDR programs in order to succeed in its goals.  
Due to the underfunding problem to run the DDR program to the reintegration phase, most 
ex-combatants, who are the major subject, are not adequately catered for. Demand for quick 
fix from international community, and donors can put huge pressure on the DDR process 
(Muggah, 2009). Conflict of political interest can also put pressure on the program, making it 
more difficult to successfully reintegrate the ex-fighters into communities on time. It is 
important to understand that the reintegration of ex-combatants is relevant for sustainable 
peace and national security.  This phase of DDR is a social-economic and developmental 
process that is carried out in communities at local level with an open time frame (Jennings 
2008). 
 
1.1.3 Re-Defining Security  
The concept of security has been redefined. Security today does not only constitute the 
protection of state against state or external threat, but also internal threats (Lipschutz 1995). It 
is through employing this new meaning that peace building in the aftermath of war can be 
accomplished and conflict prevented. Previous research shows that securitizing postwar 
countries especially in an aftermath of civil conflict, should guarantee the security of every 
actor in order to reach a peace deal (Zeeuw 2008). It is against this backdrop that this research 
is conducted to prove that if major issues faced by actors in conflict like combatant‟s personal 
security and well being are well tackled, further threats of violence recurrence can be reduced 
and even prevented.  
Ex-combatants find themselves in a vulnerable position today in Liberia and other post-war 
countries. They can be easily lured by some power hungry or potential spoilers to return to 
warfare, and activities that can undermine public security as argued by Stephen Stedman in 
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his „Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes‟. It is important to highlight measures and strategies 
that are relevant to prevent the manipulation of ex-fighters by some power hungry politicians 
and spoilers that await the slightest windows of opportunity during postwar reconstruction.  
Ex-combatants are also sometimes the victims, who are taken advantage of by warlords and 
politicians to propel them to power as mentioned by one rebel General Butt Naked in a recent 
interview (Daily Mail, 2010). Therefore, the documented neglect and exclusion of ex-
combatants from active participation in socio-economic life could undermine efforts at 
consolidating the postwar society. It is a mistake to ignore or act as if these ex-combatants 
have no serious issues that pose threat to the national security. Ronnie Lipschutz; for example, 
has argued that: 
On closer inspection, however, it is evident that most of the threats posited by those who have argued 
for a redefinition of security have primarily to do with human health and welfare, social problems 
internal source of instability, and the costs imposed upon societies by the disruption of customary ways 
of doing things. While such threats certainly could affect the safety, cohesion and stability of 
individuals, families, communities, societies, and even countries, it was and is by no means clear that 
these constitute “security threats” or problems of “national security”...(Lipschutz 1995,p.6).   
   
Studies have shown today that intrastate conflicts have destabilized regions like the Middle 
East, Latin America and Africa for decades and on (Carment and Schnabel, 2003). The 
increase of intra-state conflicts, proxy interstate conflicts, and semi-conventional wars has 
drawn the attention of world and regional bodies such as UN, NATO, AU and ECOWAS. 
Through DDR initiatives, regional and world bodies are now able to create secure working 
environment for peace building. If governments of countries in these trouble spots can only 
act responsibly by caring for the well being of citizens, including ex-combatants that are 
living in destitute lives in these countries; national security will surely be improved. 
Postwar reconstruction requires a secured working environment. But, to obtain enabling 
working environment, one has to look beyond the political and socio-economic spectrums. In 
other words, the agents of insecurity have to be identified, and strategies put in place to 
stabilize the existing threats of insecurity. In the case of Liberia, it is evident that the defunct 
warring factions and some civilian combatants are the primary agents of insecurity, who may 
take weapons to fight if the need arises. Therefore, the first objective of UN led peace 
building mission in Liberia was to constructively engage those agents (warring factions and 
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combatants) of insecurity in order to create a secure society and working environment. To 
reach this goal, the targeted individuals (combatants) will have to undergo securitizing 
process through program such as DDRR. 
The DDRR program in Liberia was initiated by UN, and regional body to stabilize the 
security threat in the postwar reconstruction of Liberia. However, for the security situation in 
Liberia to become normal as compared to other postwar countries like Angola, Mozambique 
and Rwanda, those causes and factors that led to the insecurity in Liberia should be addressed 
and resolved mainly considering the combatants as high priority.  This is usually done through 
both quick impact programs, and long term programs that are about to be disused in detail in 
this study.   
The concepts used in this paper to further explain the theoretical theme word (Securitization) 
of this research are effective and efficient tools in measuring the impact that the DDRR 
program has had on the ex-combatants in post-war reconstruction areas around the world. The 
means by which ex-fighters earn their living, and support their families after DDR programs 
can give better clue as to whether DDR goal are reached. Exploring the livelihoods of these 
ex-combatants in Monrovia will actually uncover the causes of the high unemployment of the 
ex-combatants in the oldest African republic. Human Security, Human Development and 
Reconciliation are the three concepts used in this study. I believe in any postwar 
reconstruction process, especially where civil conflict has occurred, security stabilization in 
that area can become a successful undertaking, if the three mentioned concepts are employed 
effectively and efficiently.  
Though there are other concepts believed to also be vital in stabilizing security in an effective 
way; for example, Democratization, Human Rights and Justice. However, since the main 
focus here is on the DDRR, it would have overwhelmed the entire study if every concept in 
peace building is considered and included in this paper. Furthermore, Democracy, Justice, and 
the Rule of Law can be achieved in the aftermath of war only where DDR program is being 
successfully implemented (Zeeuw 2008). Therefore, Human Security, Human Development 
and Reconciliation are the best conceptual tools that I prefer to use in this paper to support the 
ideal of securitization in post-conflict reconstruction since combatants are the major subjects 
under discussion.  
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For further clarification, this paper‟s intention is to investigate how well the DDRR was 
conducted in Liberia with regards to the possibility of ex-fighters earning better incomes 
legitimately from stable jobs, but not to investigate the overall performance of UN mission in 
Liberia. Hence, within the DDRR initiative, the investigation focused specifically on the ex-
combatants and their associates including their host communities. To put this in context, the 
ex-combatants are the primary subjects or focus group in this investigation.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Ex-Combatants are finding it difficult to cope with life during post-conflict reconstruction due 
to their less qualification and untrustworthiness, which leads to high unemployment amongst 
them (Microcon 2010). Those of Liberia are no exception to this uphill battle for political and 
socio-economic balance during post-war reconstruction. 
Ex-fighters are just like ordinary people with high hopes and determination for better lives for 
themselves and their families. They are desperate, using all means necessary including 
criminal means to survive in a society of neglect; where they are subjected to retribution and 
unemployment by locals. Without proper solution to their neglect, retribution and 
unemployment, peace will remain elusive in the postwar era, undermining the security of the 
entire country.  
The question is how are the ex-combatants surviving in the absence of stable and better 
paying jobs? Are they employing their DDR training skills to earn a legitimate living? Are 
some involved in criminalities? If so, why? What are the strategies and policies put in place to 
reintegrate these ex-fighters in order for them to earn a better living, and prevent recurrence of 
violent conflict and crimes?        
 
1.3 Hypothesis   
That the failure of ex-combatants to obtain stable, and legitimate jobs could undermine their 
personal security and eventually the postwar security of Liberia.  
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 




1. What was the focus of the DDRR program in Liberia? 
2. What was the plan for reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life with regards to 
jobs and accommodation? 
3. How did the DDRR program envisage ex-combatants to support themselves 
economically in the post-war era? 
4. Were the ex-combatants provided with useful vocational training to enable them to 
have access to jobs, accommodations, and participation in community development? 
5. Did the DDRR program prepare the larger society to accommodate the ex-
combatants? 
6. What are the perceptions of ex-combatants about the DDRR program? 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The importance of this research is that it makes the cause of present insecurity in Liberia 
explicit for practitioners to rethink and come up with new strategies and policies towards the 
preparation of ex-combatants for legitimate and stable livelihoods. The paramount importance 
is how these new strategies and policies can improve the lives of ex-fighters in the aftermath 
of war on a long term basis mainly during post-war reconstruction and beyond. The study 
further pinpoints innovative approaches to preparing former fighters for post-war civilian life 
through some recommendations that are mentioned at the conclusion of this piece of work. If 
those issues surrounding the sustainable livelihoods of ex-combatants are not well addressed, 
lasting peace will always be elusive, with a full scale violent conflict being inevitable. 
From the findings of this paper, I strongly believe that the recommendations put forth will 
make DDR program more meaningful, making it to become an effective tool in post-war 
reconstruction more than before.  
     
1.6 Operational Definition 
For better comprehension of what the research is trying to portray, it is important to give clear 
definition of the appropriate jargons used in this paper. 
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Combatant: By definition of the Geneva Convention, a combatant is a person who takes a 
direct part in the hostilities of an armed conflict. There are two kinds of combatants, a lawful 
and an unlawful combatant. A lawful is a person who takes a direct part in the hostilities of an 
armed conflict, and who upon capture, does qualify for prisoner of war status. As for the 
unlawful combatants it is a bit complicated to identify or distinguish them from lawful 
combatants due to the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949 that calls 
for the protection of both lawful and unlawful combatants including civilians with regards to 
human rights. However, we can say an unlawful combatant is considered a civilian combatant 
who does not enjoy treatment as Prisoner Of War (POW) when captured. Modern warfare like 
guerilla, terrorist and rebel movements are excellent groups that often harbor unlawful 
combatant (Dormann 2003) 
Ex-combatant:  A combatant who by official affirmation disengages from direct participation 
in armed hostilities. All combative intentions should be relinquished and refrained from and 
civilian life must be the final status of said person. 
Livelihood: A livelihood is the means by which people live, mainly their primary occupation 
that provides the basic for supporting life (Ellis 2000).  
Security: Security by definition is the degree of protection against danger, loss or criminals 
(Lipschutz 1995). Security by concept is the protective separation of what is at threat (assets) 
from the threat itself. In peace studies, it is believed that security is a perfect breeder of peace; 
therefore, security is considered as a condition where people are encouraged to refrain from 
becoming threat to others or themselves. The term also refers to all elements of human 
security. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis     
The thesis is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 is subdivided into two sections, section 
one and section two. Section one covers the introduction, research problem, hypothesis, 
research objectives, relevance of the study and some operational definitions of major 
concepts. Section two focuses on the methodology. It covers study area (Monrovia, Liberia), 
sampling procedures, and technique of data collection. It‟s also comprised of interview, group 
discussion, observation, field experience, limitation and ethical issues. 
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Chapter 2 revisits the background issues, focusing on the Liberian civil war, the peace 
agreement and the DDR program.  
Chapter 3 again highlights the background issues, but this time through the theoretical theme 
word of securitization; linking three core concepts, namely human security, human 
development and reconciliation to support the theory of securitization during post-war 
reconstruction.  
Chapter 4 is where the data is presented and analyzed. This chapter has three sections. Section 
one is about personal information of the informants, section covers the livelihoods of the 
informants and section three is about their reintegration in post-war Liberia with regards to 
permanent employment and sustainable livelihoods. 
The last chapter is chapter 5. It is about the conclusion with some final recommendations. 
This chapter tries to summarize why the present security situation in Liberia is still fragile 
with numerous threats that can undermine the stability of Liberia. After the summary of the 
entire research, the thesis then put forth recommendations that can improve those issues 
threatening the peace in Liberia and other post-war areas. 
 
Section Two: Methodological Framework  
1.8 Study Area-Monrovia, Liberia   
The study was conducted in Monrovia, the Liberian capital city. My research was carried out 
from June to July of 2009. In a general view, Liberia is a secular state located on the west 
coast of Africa. It borders Sierra Leone on the west, Republic of Guinea at the north, Ivory 
Coast on the east and the Atlantic Ocean at the south. The country has a land area of 111,369 
sq km with geographical coordinates of 6 30° N, 9 30° W.  The population of Liberia is 
approximately 3.44 million people with a little over a million people living in its capital, 
Monrovia. Liberia is divided into 15 political subdivision (counties) and 16 local tribes or 
ethnic groups.  
Liberia is officially considered as Africa‟s oldest republic, gaining independence on July 26, 
1847. Liberia is a founding member of the Mano River Union, ECOWAS, Organization of 
African United now African Union and United Nations. It is one of the few remaining 
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countries with vast reserve of tropical rain forest that is home to thousands of animal and 
plant species. Though considered poor, Liberia has a huge reserve of natural resources like 
iron ore, timber, gold and other agricultural related products that constitute about 77% of the 
total GDP of $1.626 billion (CIA Factbook 2009). 
Monrovia was chosen as the study area because of its strategic importance to all warring 
factions during and after the civil war. Despite Monrovia being a social and economical 
attraction for ex-combatants, it is presently the home of most belligerents that participated in 
the war and the DDRR program. In Monrovia, every former warring faction is accounted for, 
giving me easy access to ex-combatants, headquarters of relevant agencies, institutions and 
individuals that vital information can be solicited from for the study.  
Besides being the largest city, and the home to 1/3 of Liberia‟s population, Monrovia is the 
leading industrial, commercial, social-economical and political capital of Liberia. Monrovia is 
Liberia‟s most bustling city, making it the most important city in the country. It is a multi-
cultural city that is represented by all religions, races and people from all walks of life. The 
busy streets and market places are very noisy with daily activities of real people. Monrovia‟s 
Infrastructures comprised of modern mansions, middle class homes and mixed shape ghetto 
houses, which gives the city multiple views.  
About 85% of Liberians are unemployed or do not have stable jobs. In recent years the GDP 
per capital income has increased to about $ 400-$500, but this only constitute the 15% of 
Liberians found in top and middle class jobs. Most of the country‟s rural dwellers live mostly 
on subsistence farming. With new fiscal policies and salaries increment put in place recently, 
it is promising for these figures reflecting per capital income to increase in three digits in the 
following years to come (UNDP 2009).   
Like any other Sub-Saharan Africa nation, Liberia has a very high illiteracy rate. Over half of 
the population has no formal education. Some statistics put it as high as 70% of the population 
being illiterate, that is those who have no formal education or cannot read and write.  Majority 
of the ex-combatants are found within the categories of unemployment and illiteracy. They 
become vulnerable to politician and other potential spoilers because of their lack of proper 




1.9 Sampling  
Generally, sampling is the selection of some cases to examine in detail, and use the outcome 
to understand a much larger set of cases (Neuman 2011). The sampling size of this research is 
relatively small as compared to the overall number of ex-combatants reportedly to have gone 
through the DDRR program in Liberia. However, this small number of 30 principal 
informants did serve the purpose of the study.  
My selected group of informants was 30 male ex-combatants. The 30 men were from 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD), Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and Militia soldiers comprising of 
Charles Taylor‟s Anti-Terrorist Unite (ATU).    
The 30 male informants were selected from amongst those that were willing to participate in 
the study at a short notice and within the limited timeframe during the research. Since I was 
using multiple research methods such as Mixed and Purposive methods, it was expedient to 
talk to people with in-depth knowledge of issues relating to the research especially ex-
combatants that had completed the DDR program. They were visited at their homes and other 
places that we agreed to meet. Those informants that were selected presented their ex-
combatant DDR participation ID cards and certificates obtained from vocational training to 
prove their authenticity for being the right informants. 
Besides the primary subjects, information was also gathered from DDR officials, locals and 
former generals of the various warring parties.       
In the Liberian society, male has been the predominant gender, making them the decision 
makers and leaders in every sub-cultural group despite women being the president today.  
History shows that every civil unrest and military hostility that occurred in Liberia from the 
1980s has been orchestrated and led by men (Youboty 2004). However, this study is not 
concentrated on gender equality, but rather on real life context of ex-combatants well being 
that if not properly addressed could probably lead to the recurrence of violent conflict. It is 
often noted that the agents of present day insecurity in most post-war countries are 
presumably the ex-combatants and those associated with the conflict. Those posing security 
threat to the postwar reconstruction of Liberia are mostly the men (Youboty 2004). The armed 
robbers taking rubber plantations, mineral mines and constantly raiding communities with 
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terror are not women but men. Even if females were to be considered in the study, the one 
month research period was not enough to find willing female ex-combatant. 
I was told by some interviewees that most of the registered female ex-combatants were just 
family members or associates to combatants that had access to weapons to undergo the DDR 
just for incentives. Most of them were not actual combatants; they were wives, daughters or 
sisters to the male fighters. Females who are raped victims and sex slaves may technically fit 
the definition of the DDR program target group. But the post traumatic stress associated with 
victims from the Liberian civil war especially amongst female has an embarrassing stigma 
that they will have to live with for the rest of their lives. Most of the female ex-fighters 
preferred not to talk about their past ordeal during the Liberian conflict, and convincing them 
to participate in case study like this is very difficult.  
There were some females who took advantage of DDRR offers as a temporary means to 
improve their social-economic circumstances. Previous studies show that most of these 
females were only pushing for the economic benefits and often refrain from being interviewed 
or even classify as ex-combatant afterwards (Muggah 2009). This complicates the finding of 
female ex-combatants in the scope of one month. Those females who actually fought during 
the Liberian civil-war, and also went through the DDR program; believed it is embarrassing 
,and also has a negative ramification on their chances of becoming wives or respected 
stakeholders in the post-war society of Liberia if interviewed or referred to as former fighter. 
Being so conscious of public reactions, they often shy away and take their war experiences as 
personal issues.  It is very important to make these points clear as the reasons for not 
including female informants in the sampling. Female informants could have been included, 
but getting them requires a considerable amount of time and resources, which I never had. 
  
1.10 Data Collecting Techniques 
The method used in collecting data for this study is the Mixed Methods through purposive 
selection. This research was revolved around primary data gathering to give a solid basis for 
credible findings. I am conscious of gatekeepers, planted agents and access restriction to 
information, and know that they all can threaten the authenticity and reliability of what is 
understudy. However, this section intends to depict the method used in the research.  
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Mixed Methods or triangulation method allows one to analyze both quantitative and 
qualitative data (Maanen 1983). The Mixed Method will give me the advantage of handling 
archival data such as statistical data obtained from secondary sources and those primary data 
collected from my fieldwork (Yin 2009, p. 174). The combine used of both quantitative 
method in the form of statistical data handling and qualitative method through the purposive 
sampling sequence will definitely strengthen the data quality in this study.  
Archival data from NCDDRR /UNDP, data collected from interviews, group discussions and 
observation during this research are the core data sources of the entire study. Data from each 
source is interpreted in different measures; therefore, using the Mixed Method will create a 
compatible cohesion through which those data can be presented and analyzed within one 
accord.  
The primary data collected during this study was done through purposive sampling procedure. 
Purposive sampling is a kind of case study research strategy that single out a small size of a 
given population or group as the subject because of their in-depth knowledge and expertise of 
the case understudy (Neuman 2011). 
To further grasp how I collected my primary data, I should first clarify some doubts on case 
study method. Case study is a research strategy used to conduct an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context (Mason 2002). Exploring the 
livelihoods of Liberian ex-combatants is a particular case drawn out of many cases in Liberia. 
The livelihood of ex-combatant is the phenomenon that is being focused on within the 
research; therefore, the entire investigation will concentrate on the livelihoods of Liberian ex-
combatants in general. Let me make a point clear, case study is not restricted to just 
qualitative research alone (Yin 2009). Though case study is often used in qualitative research, 
but it can also be used in quantitative research too.       
 
1.11 Interviewing 
Normally interview is a conversation between two or more people where questions are asked 
to obtain information (Neuman 2011). During research interview, information is gathered 
from subjects to test hypothesis and/or highlight a research problem. There are many formal 
and informal channels to go about getting interview done. In this study, the semi-structure 
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interview, focus group discussions and observation were all key methods used to obtain 
relevant information. No matter what pattern one chooses, the objective of getting knowledge 
or information should be the key goal.   
From the days of old, it is believed that „Knowledge is power‟. “But those who leak 
„knowledge‟ that others wish to remain silenced are in the position of great vulnerability” 
(Somekh and Lewin 2005:41). Today social researchers will press against all odds to obtain 
information from informants while doing fieldwork; in return, those researchers gain 
knowledge and information that are unknown. Interviewing of informants is the most 
important aspect of creditable information gathering and also crucial point on the field. 
Therefore it is important to conduct interviews with caution of not to cause harm and not be 
harmed.   
    
1.11.1 Semi-Structure Interview 
One of the patterns used to collect data during the study was through semi-structure interview. 
Semi-structure interview in context is an interview during research where interviewees freely 
participate without fixed questions (Mason 2002). This kind of interviewing is relevant to my 
research because it gives room for fresh questions, ideas and exploration for the topic under 
discussion. With this pattern, I was able to get down to major points that the informants were 
interested in at the same time putting some specific questions of relevance through. The semi-
structure interview usually creates the avenue for openness and in-depth discussion bringing 
forth expected and unexpected questions and answers.  
The important advantage I had was being an insider (former soldier of AFL). This puts me in 
a better position of discussing in-depth issues at the same pace and level with the informants. 
With this background I had more knowledge on the issues under discussion already, which 
narrows the room for my informants altering stories and providing false information.  
My questions were not standardized like formal questionnaire used in large survey data 
collection because my interview technique was not a formal structure interview. This was 
mostly like a guide to questions that were relevant to the topic and giving opportunity to my 
informants to contribute from freely during the entire interviewing process. The questions 
were straightly formulated for the 30 primary informants, meanly designed for gathering 
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answers at the same time exploring their individual stories. They were asked about personal 
information, background and their benefits acquired from the DDRR program. 
Being a former Liberian soldier myself, coupled with my ethnic background (Krahn) 
apparently reduced the possibilities of coming across gatekeepers, planted informants, and 
less informed individuals who usually give misleading and bias information. With my 14 
years of military experience as AFL soldier I was in a better prepared, physically and 
mentally, for the research than other previous researchers; especially when it comes to dealing 
with those hard to reach ex-combatants, and establishing rapport with them.    
   
1.11.2 Focus Group Discussion  
Focus group discussion is a group discussion often guided by a facilitator, during which 
participants talk freely and spontaneously across the board about a certain topic (Mason 
2002). The focus group discussion method is relevant to my study because it helps to obtain 
in-depth information about concepts, perceptions and ideas surrounding the ex-combatants. 
Group discussions with ex-combatants from defunct Liberian United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL), and Charles Taylor‟s integrated rebels-turned-AFL known as Anti-Terrorists 
Unite (ATU) were held on a daily basis. The working relationship was fascinating and they 
were delighted to talk to me about their disappointment in the reintegration phase of the 
DDRR initiative in Liberia. Four of the interviewees explained in tears while telling their 
frustration in the Program. “No work for us, the people fooled us and lie to us big time”, one 
middle age informants explained.  
I conducted four group discussions with the ex-combatants and each of these discussions was 
conducted under a peaceful atmosphere. The focus group discussions were held in groups of 6 
and 8 informants at a time. The small size was meant to enable every informant to be active 
participants during the discussion. From their voices and body language, one could sense the 






Observation is a method in research work where researcher uses his/her sense such as seeing 
and hearing to obtain information about the subject (Silverman 2006). Sometimes the used of 
scientific instruments to record data during fieldwork can be considered as observation as 
well. The observation method was important to my study because it gives me the opportunity 
to get to know my subjects, brings me closer to them and makes me to understand things from 
their perspective. It was more like being part of social world of the informants. 
One of the most important tools in social research is observation. Observing the informants is 
very crucial to knowing the reliability of the information they are passing on. As a researcher, 
observation is a primary tool in gathering information during research. Therefore, using 
senses of observation thoroughly will give a better edge in making decision based on what 
have been observed. 
The expression, the gesture, the language tone and choice of words of informants during the 
research were opted for observation. Throughout my study, I used keen observation to capture 
information that the interviewees were not willing to share with me. All the informants 
communicated through the Liberian Pidgin English and local dialect with lots of slangs that 
are difficult to understand. However, I needed no translator because I understand and speak 
their colloquial perfectly including three local dialects (Krahn, Gio and Bassa).  
 
1.12 Field Experience  
Getting connected to various contacts was not easy, despite my background as an ex-soldier 
and a native of my study area. Building up a good rapport with the interviewees was 
important. However, being an insider gave me an upper advantage over other researchers that 
have visited Liberia to document cases of such. Where and how to find the right people was 
important. Being familiarized with the study area made it easy for me to move around. There 
was no need for second party interpreter. Most importantly, I was not perceived as a paid 
agent or an undercover outside agent of the West sent to track down war criminals. I was 
wholeheartedly received by the informants, and they were glad for the documentation of their 
stories, which they expected would be published for the rest of the world to view.  
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Most of the informants were found in ghettos, slums and casual work places in Monrovia. 
Former generals and other influential people were very cooperative after knowing the purpose 
of my research. Some of those contacted are parliament members, NCDDRR officials, rebel 
turned politicians and officials of government. They provided colossal assistance in finding 
the relevant informants for the research which was really rewarding. Through their 
cooperation, I was able to identify, track and trace information rich informants. 
I visited some of ex-combatants at their homes and work places; went for football practice 
with them on some occasions and even ate with them. All these were done to build better 
bond, trust and confidence with them.  
 
1.15 Limitation of the Study 
The major limitations of this study were the short time used for the data collection on the field 
and my background as former AFL soldier. I spent about a month collecting data, which was 
very inadequate. Giving the nature of the research, three months would have been adequate 
for the undertaking. It was difficult in gathering the informants at a short notice. Reaching an 
agreeable meeting arrangement with respondents was time consuming. It took days for the 
first batch of informants to sign in for our first meeting after being in Monrovia for over a 
week.  
As an insider conducting research with respondents that were once enemies and/or friends, I 
feel this puts me in an awkward position in refraining from being bias and not paying better 
attention to my former enemy combatants. To the redundant AFL, I was like a friend and 
comrade with the good intention of making their voices heard. On the contrary, I had the fear 
of being seen as former enemy by ex-combatants from the other defunct warring factions. 
Even if I am not perceived as former enemy by these respondents, producing an honest and 
credible report was always going to be a serious challenge for me.      
Others hindrances were the unwillingness of NCDDRR officers to cooperate, limited funds 
and not including female as primary informants in the study. After knowing that my research 
was more about depicting the weaknesses of the Liberian DDRR, officials from NCDDRR 
began to question the legality of my study and wanting to know which organization I am 
representing. The secretariat of NCDDRR, out of a sudden told me that the meeting was 
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postponed to two weeks. With limited time left for my stay in Liberia, I pressed on hard to get 
some information from their final report but to no avail. After the two weeks of 
postponement, I was able to meet two officers from NCDDRR and they were really 
resourceful to my research. 
The lack of enough funds to cover the research was a very serious issue. Traveling between 
my temporary residence and the field was very demanding. Commuters were literally engaged 
in fist fight with each other on a daily basis just to get on public transportation such as bus and 
taxi cab. Renting a vehicle would have cost me up $ 200.00 a day, which was far beyond my 
budget. With little money to rent car, I was compelled to join the commuters under these 
testing conditions just to get from one point to another for data gathering. The delays caused 
by getting on public transportation from one point to another resulted to the cancellation of 
some appointments making it impossible for me to get some important information from other 
ends.  
Just as I have given my justification for not including female in previous lines, I remain. 
However, no matter how best the reasons in my opinion for not including female as primary 
informants may be, I am absolutely aware of the gender imbalance in my study and the 
consequential critique that this action may prompt in some quarters. I hope my reasons for 
excluding female as informants from this study should be seen as facts faced on the field and 
not an act of anti-gender equality.  
     
1.16 Ethical Considerations     
It is of paramount importance to consider the relationship between you the researcher and the 
informants with regards to sensitive issues of ethical behavior while doing a research 
(Walliman 2006).  The safety, privacy and consent of my respondents went in line with the 
ethical approach in doing social research. Every ethical value was highly considered and well 
held to during the study. 
Participation was open to willing respondents with no act of direct or indirect coercion and 
false promises in order to obtain information.  The informants knew that I was a student from 
a Norwegian university doing a research on ex-combatants and not a philanthropist whom 
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they could benefit from financially. One thing they were sure of was their stories will be 
published and at least heard by few people in the outside world. 
Building a cordial working relationship with the informants was important. From this rapport, 
confidence and trust were built. Playing soccer with the community youth in my temporary 
resident stopping place, visiting homes of some informants and dinning with some of them 
was a way of conveying a strong friendly relationship. Throughout the study, the informants 
were convinced that I was doing more good than harm and that I was worthy of their trust. 
Respect and confidentiality agreement of respondents was taken into high consideration as 
well. Respect for what and who they are was never taken advantage of. Every conversation 
carried out was confidential, taking into consideration cultural norms, values and traditions. I 
did not draw line between the respondents and myself; we ate the same food together during 
lunch time. Some of them even spoke the same local dialect that I speak (Krahn), which really 
helped to build that unique bond that was necessary for good working relationship on the 














Chapter Two: Liberia; From Conflict to Peace Agreement      
2.1 Brief History of the Liberian Civil Conflict 
The Liberian civil conflict started as the result of resentment, grievance, greed, power 
struggle, poverty, socio-economic inequality, suppression, ethnicity, corruptions among others 
(Collier & Hoeffler 2009). Since the coming of the ex-slaves from America in the 1820s, 
resentment has been built up between the resettled ex-slaves and the natives (Indigenous tribal 
people). The ex-slaves or the elites ruled Liberia for more than 133 years from the day of 
independence in 1847 to 1980. They ruled Liberia with iron hands and suppressed the 
indigenous people while the wealth of the country was shared among members of their inner 
circle (Youboty 2004). 
Though there were some revolts staged by the indigenous people in the early days of the elite 
dynasty, but they were neutralized in short time. The defeat of the natives helped the elite 
regimes to keep ruling until 1980, when the reign of the Americo-Liberians, as they (ex-
slaves/elites) are sometimes called, came to an end through Samuel K. Doe led  military coup 
(Youboty 2004). In that coup, the then President, William R. Tolbert was killed, bringing to 
power a native indigenous person for the first time in the Liberian history since the 1820s. 
Samuel Doe, who was a native son, came with retribution and resentment against descendants 
of the ex-slaves. During Doe‟s regime many government officials from Tolbert‟s government 
were executed and imprisoned including the present President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Even 
natives that had connections with the elite rulers (ex-slaves) were persecuted.  
It is evidence that unemployment, illiteracy and poverty are some of the contributing factors 
for civil unrest and military hostilities (Youboty 2004). Politicians usually take advantage of 
this caliber of people to launch operations and programs of self-interest at the expense of the 
poor masses without considering the ramification that their actions may lead to. Struggle for 
balance of power, social justice, socio-economic equality and respect for human rights were 
fair enough reasons to revolt against dictatorial and corrupt regimes in Liberia. The moment 
power is seized, the ordinary people are then perceived as potential threats to the ruling party. 
Instead of following those democratic principles to the letter, they then deviate from the 
democratic norms and values by transforming into dictators. Names like the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy in Liberia 
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(LURD) among others came with the platform of liberation and freedom fighter. Instead of 
standing for their cause and manifestos, they themselves became the mayhem.    
In December 1989, Taylor started his revolt against Doe as a pure revenge for the 
mistreatment of the Americo-Liberian and the Gio and Mano by Doe in Liberia. After nine 
months of intensive guerrilla rebel style of military campaign by Charles G. Taylor and Prince 
Y. Johnson against Doe, Samuel Kanyan Doe was toppled.  By September 1990, Samuel Doe 
was captured at the Free Port of Monrovia by Prince Y. Johnson, who was an ally to Taylor. 
Doe was mutilated alive and decapitated by Johnson and his men. Prince Johnson was a 
native indigenous man from the Gio/Mano ethnic group. The Gio and Mano were politically 
and physically victimized during Doe‟s reign with torture, imprisonment, arbitrary arrest, 
unlawful detention and secret killings. The Gio and Mano on the other hand made numerous 
attempts to topple Doe from power but failed. Taylor, who is a descendant of the ex-slaves, 
cleverly recruited members of the Gio and Mano ethnic tribes, who already had resentment 
against Doe, to join him in the fight against Doe dictatorial rule. However, the fight was not 
only taken to Doe, but to all members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic tribes. In respond to 
this collective attack, the Krahn and Mandingo teamed up to fight back. This is how the four 
ethnic tribes became the major characters of the Liberian civil conflict.  Doe was a Krahn and 
the Mandingos were Doe sympathizers (Youboty 2004). 
After the death of Doe, the conflict did not end there as most ordinary Liberians thought. 
Many other warring factions emerged; few peace agreements were signed and broken. Five 
different transitional power sharing governments were established. In 1997, Taylor was 
elected president, but three years later, conflict erupted again in Liberia. Taylor was attacked 
from two fronts by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) fighting 
from the north-west of Liberia and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) 
fighting from the south-east of Liberia. The conflict took the lives of about 300,000 people 
and ruins all basic functions of the state (Pajibo 2005).  Charles Taylor who is presently 
facing charges for war crime and crimes against humanity at The Hague was in 2003, forced 






2.2 The Accra Peace Agreement 
Peace agreement was reached in Accra, Ghana in 2003. The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed by LURD, MODEL, GOL (Government of Liberia) and the 
Civil Society of Liberia. The Accra Peace Agreement was brokered by West Africa regional 
body ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) supported by the United 
Nations. The CPA calls for the cessation of hostilities, formation of a power sharing 
transitional government, employment of DDRR, democratic elections and formation of a 
National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Pajibo 2005). Since 2003, the CPA has been 
implemented with one phase after another. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was democratically elected 
in 2005 general elections, becoming the first female president in African political history. 
This study is mainly about the DDRR program; therefore, the study focused on the objectives 
of the DDRR program vis-a-vis the livelihoods of the ex-combatants. Implicit in this 
consideration is that improvement in the lives of ex-combatants will translate into security in 
postwar Liberia. 
 
2.3 Keeping the Peace in Liberia 
By the last quarter of 2003, the Accra Peace Agreement was already having a positive impact 
on the Liberia conflict. Cease fire was holding as the first boots of ECOWAS soldiers were 
deployed in collaboration with the United States Army. The joint multi military forces of 
United Nations and ECOWAS called ECOMIL were deployed through the logistical support 
of the US Army. People were celebrating in every street of Monrovia welcoming the peace 
keeping soldiers marking the beginning to the end of 14 years of human suffering. Thousands 
of Liberian came out on the first day of deployment to see the military show up of the US 
Army and modern weaponry. This was a relief from the constant fear under which Liberians 
lived for 14 years. 
The peace keeping mission in Liberia was under the auspices of the United Nations. By 2004, 
there were about 15,000 UN peace keepers serving in the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL). 
The role of UNMIL was to spearhead the peace process by encouraging the implementation 
of the Accra Peace Agreement reached by all parties into the Liberia civil crisis. The UN 
troops were first deployed in Monrovia and then to the rest of the country. Buffer zones and 
checkpoints were set up at major highways separating warring factions. The multinational UN 
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troop‟s primary objective was to ensure a stable and secure environment which will pave the 
way for a transitional peace building. The deployment of UN 15,000 troops was a convincing 
and genuine security guarantee to all parties.   
A national transitional government was established to work in collaboration with the UNMIL 
to smoothly carry out the Liberia peace process. This new transitional government was 
headed by a Liberian businessman, Charles Gyude Bryant. It was the goal of the transitional 
government, through the help of UNMIL, to conduct DDRR initiative, to be followed by 
general elections. The DDRR process in Liberia was meant for a strong security guarantee for 
every Liberian both combatants and non-combatants. At the end of the DDRR program in 
Liberia, it was expected that combatants would have regained civilian status and weapons be 
removed from the society. However, as this study focuses on the impact of DDRR on the lives 
of ex-combatants, it is important to understand that the study will strongly examine factors 
that are leading to present days‟ security problems in Liberia. Completing the DDRR program 
does not necessarily mean one has been reintegrated in the society. The reintegration of ex-
combatants has been a hitch of DDRR program worldwide, including that of Liberia (Muggah 
2009). Reintegration does not only entail changing ex-combatants into civilians, but also their 
reconciliatory acceptance by the communities that they once ravaged, and how best they 
(combatants) can become assets to their communities through stable employment. 
  
2.4 Securitizing through Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration   
Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRR) conceptualizes the 
security of the state‟s population and the capacity building of combatants‟ well-being during 
post-war reconstruction (Castillo 2008). The major aim is to build the capacity of combatants 
in a meaningful way so that they can find peaceful and legitimate means of coping with life in 
the civilian world instead of by violence means (Muggah 2009). To fulfill this task, there are 
two things that one must concentrate on, the combatants and their communities or locals.  
The following are brief objectives of DDRR given by the former UN Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan: 
 Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunitions, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also 
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civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms 
management program to prevent the recirculation and proliferation of collected arms. 
 Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from 
armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend 
from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of 
troops in camps designated for this purpose. This includes the disbandment of 
command and control facilities and relocation of combatants into cantonment site, 
encampment site or barracks, where basic incentives and other packages are provided 
to them. 
 Reinsertion is when the combatants and their families are given basic needs. This 
phase last from disbarment until reintegration begins. Reinsertion is a short term 
living support while in this transitional period. Basic life support in the form of 
allowance, food, clothes, shelter, medical services. This phase is where combatants 
are educated formally, trained in vocational schools and given basic working tools 
upon completion to enable them cope with the reintegration. 
 Reintegration is a long term, continuous social and economic process of development. 
Reintegration is where ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable 
employment and legitimate income. Reintegration is often a socio-economic process 
with an open time table, primarily taking place in communities at local level.(UN-SG 
A/C.5/59/31) 
 
The DDRR in Liberia was launched in December 2003, but was interrupted by some 
backlashes from combatants due to missteps and inadequate preparation for the launching of 
the program. The disruption caused the death of about nine persons, which sent a strong signal 
of the tough future challenges that lie ahead of the DDRR practitioners. It was then suspended 
and resumed in early 2004 at which time better plan was put in place to smoothly carry out 
the DDRR process. Although, the program was poorly planned and fused with 
mismanagement, interruption and flaws, but this did not prevent the employment of DDRR 
initiative from kick-starting. The National Commission for DDRR (NCDDRR) was 
established to provide the overall supervision and policy guidance to the Program (Activity 
Report- Trust Fund-UNDP 2009). The NCDDRR was comprised of representatives from the 
warring factions, the UN, the ECOWAS, EC, USA and the NTGL respectively. However, the 
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program was a multi-lateral joint effort by numerous parties and stakeholders. Parties 
included were the UN, the NTGL, international community, non-governmental organizations 
and implementing partners. 
The entire process ran from December 2003 to July 2009 with some breaking laps in-between 
due to lack of funding and previous reasons just mentioned. The program was divided into 
phases just as seen in the acronym meaning. Disarmament is the first phase; followed by 
demobilization, and rehabilitation and then reintegration as the last but continue phase. 
The program was characterized by the collection of weapons, encampment of registered 
combatants, education (vocational training/formal education), resettlement, medical care and 
$300 for allowance. The $300 was given in two installments; first $150 is given after 
registration, which covers (disarmament and demobilization) and the balance $150 is given 
before entering the reintegration preparation programs (Paes 2005).   There were five known 
cantonment sites built to temporarily host the ex-combatants. The first was built at Camp 
Scheiffelin Military Barracks in Margibi County, just a few kilometers from Monrovia. 
Additional four were built in Gbarnga, Buchanan, Tubmanburg and VOA, in order to 
reinforce the preparedness of program. Additional cantonment sites were erected in leeward 
cities such as Zwedru, Ganta, Kakata, Tappita and Voinjama respectively.  
Though the program was marked by some flaws and quick fix errors that overwhelmed it with 
financially desperate civilians and individuals who took advantage of those loopholes, but the 
DD portion was considered successful in military term. After the disarmament and 
demobilization phases, about 103,000 ex-combatants, over 28,314 weapons, about 6,500,000 
small arms ammunition and 33,604 other projectiles and explosive were reported collected 
(NCDDRR/UNDP 2008).  
The reinsertion and reintegration phases have been strongly criticized by researchers and 
freethinkers due to the present security problems in the country. About 90,000 ex-combatants 
were recruited for the reintegration phase and just about 78,000 of them completed vocational 
training and formal education offered to them. Additional 9,000 leftover ex-combatants 
entered and completed the RR phase between 2008 and 2009 (NCDDRR/UNDP-Report 
2008).  Investigation conducted by this paper reviles that thousands of combatants were left 
out including about 8,000 officers of the AFL. These left over combatants were only disarmed 
and partially demobilized but did not undergo rehabilitation and reintegration training 
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program. It was further uncovered that nearly 50% of the total ex-combatant that participated 
in the DDRR program were not bonafide combatants but rather economic disadvantage 
Liberians. These flaws were overlooked at the kickoff of DDRR program, creating avenue to 





















Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will use three core concepts to theoretically explain how DDR can become a 
stabilizing tool in postwar securitization and development. Human Security, Human 
Development and Reconciliation are the three main concepts chosen to discuss the interplay 
between securitization and development in post-conflict areas. The lead argument within this 
study is about the insecurity in Liberia due to DDR failed programs. This has caused 
dissatisfaction amongst some ex-combatants who are presumably causing problems now 
because of unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihoods. Therefore, to test this theory of 
postwar securitization, it is important to use these three concepts as measuring tools in the 
work conducted by the Liberian DDRR initiative.  
They are important for successfully implementing Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration during post-war reconstruction, using Liberia as my case study. The chapter is 
going to show how these approaches, if implemented to the letter, can stabilize security 
threats that otherwise may have likely escalated into violent conflict in a nation or region. 
These three approaches are expressed through the normative school of thought in post-war 
securitization. These concepts have become very instrumental within the United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations worldwide. And have also become an innovative way of building 
sustainable peace and a durable security system even in stable nations (Muggah 2009). As the 
argument unfolds in this paper, the strength and weaknesses of the DDRR program in Liberia 
will be made clear to the public, showing why Liberia is still considered volatile with a fragile 
and unreliable security system after the DDRR has ended with a so called „success story‟.  
Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation can highlight issues underlying 
Liberia‟s DDRR program. The three concepts deal with the well-being of people and how 
they can live a secure and peaceful life.  
When it comes to reducing violence and securing the entire society of Liberia from the 
recurrence of large scale violence conflict (intra-state conflict), we must consider the ex-
combatants as first priority. They are the ones posing threats in the society of Liberia. DDRR 
program involve certain tools that can single out individuals from a whole population in post-
conflict areas and cater for their basic needs. These individuals are combatants, their families 
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and most often relatives and associates. From this selection, the concept of freedom from fear 
and freedom from wants come into play. However, bringing all these issues smoothly together 
can be challenging for DDR program.  
 
3.2 Human Security  
DDR is a people centre program that focuses on a particular group of individuals, who are the 
combatants, their families and sometimes relatives. Human Security is a non-military 
approach to assure human survival in a devastating society especially in postwar era and 
natural disaster (UNIDIR 2011). However, Human Security concept is also used by wealthy 
nations to stabilize their countries and avoid unrest. This approach can in many instances be 
related to the Copenhagen School of Thought that strongly considered non-military issues as 
security threats (Hough 2008).  
The Copenhagen School in many ways agrees with the concept of Human Security by 
accepting the individual as the main referent object instead of the Realist view that prioritize 
the security of the state and sub-state groups (Hough 2008). The Copenhagen School concept 
will not be the rightful choice in the support to DDRR concept, but yet still, we cannot rule 
out the relevant of the Copenhagen School or Traditional Security approach, which can also 
be used to securitize post-war nation. The Copenhagen School Theory is considered to be a 
Neo-Realist and is another version of the Traditional Security. It supports the state being the 
securitizing agent; in this case, the state will play a central role and may secure its interest 
first before the individual people. Barry Buzan, who is one of the leading theorists of the 
Copenhagen School, further clarified that well structured states that execute the norms and 
values of democracy, human rights and social order can be better examples of a state serving 
as a securitizing agent (Buzan 1998).  
Western Europe; for example, is evidential to Buzan‟s argument, but logically, that cannot 
hold in intra-state conflict especially in Liberia, where the state government lacks of many 
democratic values. Buzan‟s view on Human Security is made clear in his 2009 publication 
“The Evolution of International Security Studies”. Buzan‟s argument was Human Security 
through the implementation of UNDP mainly reduces conflict between the West and South 
(Sub-Saharan Africa), and between regimes and citizens, which is relevant for conflict 
prevention. It is like Human Security provides a win-win situation for both the people and 
39 
 
state. Human Security is straightly about the guarantee of the people welfare; this is why 
Norway, Canada and Japan are ranked high amongst countries that provide better Human 
Security for their citizens. In a conflict nation like Liberia, where democracy is at a halt; as 
dictatorship and mismanagement are reigning, trust then becomes a serious problem. This 
puts the eligibility of the state government for being the securitizing agent to question. One 
cannot be a player at the same time a referee, if so, circumvention and bending of rules will be 
a common practice. It is expedient to use the Human Security concept because it is often 
conducted by a third party (humanitarian intervention) in an aftermath of war, and has no 
double standers like the Copenhagen School or Traditional Security.  
Human Security on the contrary to Traditional Security argues that the main referent for 
security should be the individuals rather than the state. Traditional Security approach has no 
better footing in this study because this is not about inter-state conflict but rather intra-state. 
In intra-state conflict, it is always people against people or state‟s leadership, making it 
difficult for the state to be the securitizing agent as argued by Buzan (2009). Some academics 
argued as to whether the state should be considered as a person(s) or thing because only 
another person can provide security for another person that is in need (Buzan 2009). Buzan‟s 
main point of argument here is that no matter what, the state will always have a role to play in 
providing security for its people making the state a securitizing actor and the people referents. 
There are ongoing debates amongst academics and theorists about redefining security and its 
concepts, but since security is interpreted based on school of thoughts, one can say the 
evolution of security is yet to unfold. 
Since the fall of the Iron Curtin (Cold War), UN has embodied Human Security approach to 
boast security and development programs in post-conflict zones. In Liberia, the DDRR 
program is no exception to Human Security approach. The conventional focus group of 
DDRR is combatants, but in recent time, this target group is broadening to accommodate 
others whose survival may be at risk, such as war affected people, non-combatants and the 
civilian population.  
The Human Security approach has seven main agendas (Economic, Food, Health, 
Environmental, Personal, Community and Political securities) and these seven elements are 
the content of freedom from fear and freedom from wants. Freedom from fear is better 
explained by protecting individuals from violent conflict through recognizing those violent 
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threats, while freedom from wants is by protecting individuals from natural threats like 
hunger, disease, flood and other natural disasters (UNIDIR 2011). Once the threats causing 
fear are removed and material needs are provided, the subjects themselves will assist in 
securitizing because they do not want to lose what they already have.   
The origin of these threats is often motivated by poverty, lack of opportunities and other 
forms of suffering including natural hazards (UN2011). Failure to properly address these 
issues often prompts violent conflicts in many developing nations (collier, Anke and Dominic 
2009). Therefore, Human Security seeks to address these problems by selecting those 
referents that are at risk or in harm‟s way. I relate this concept to DDRR because it is the 
combatants and victims of violent conflict that are singled out of a population for their Human 
Security elements to be improved in order to have better livelihoods.   
If the seven elements of UN Human Security approach are fully addressed, ex-combatants 
will have access to better life and the risk of violent conflict recurrence can be prevented or 
managed. Moreover, there will be no need to use violence conflict as the last resort, when 
future of the people is secure in a society. For example, the possibility for Norway to fight a 
civil war from now onwards is very low due to the high rated Human Security provided to its 
people. 
Let see how the seven elements of Human Security are connected to the concept of DDRR in 
securitizing post-war state which reflects the livelihoods of ex-fighters. They are explained as 
follow: 
 Economic Security_ Economic Security is the assurance of basic income for 
individual (Jolly and Deepayan 2006). If Economic Security is considered to be a 
condition of having stable income or resources to support living standard for now and 
the future, then it is arguable that combatants will need such a security in order to 
disengage from violent conflict that may cost lives‟. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the 
moment the combatants realized the short term economic benefit that they (Ex-
combatants) were about to get by participating in the DDRR program, the Program 
was overwhelmed on a short notice by combatants seeking economic safety including 
some civilian imposters. Although this was a short term measure but very relevant to 
the DDRR initiative. For the long term solution, DDRR provided education and 
vocational training for combatants. Agriculture, small business training and macro-
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loan are some of the basic and easy ventures of Liberian ex-combatants which were 
given high priority. Some ex-combatants in Liberia utilized the DDRR educational 
offer, which makes them competitive for employment amidst the high unemployment 
in Liberia. However, majority of them did not bother to take advantage of these offers 
due to illiteracy or lack of the will, making them vulnerable for easy recruitment by 
potential spoilers. Economic Security plays a vital role in stabilizing postwar 
reconstruction. When there are stable jobs from which the ex-combatants can get 
stable income, they will surely avoid everything that will threaten that job. When there 
is no income base resource, they feel that there is nothing to lose and will pursue 
illegitimate means to get money to support themselves. 
 Food Security_ Food Security is the assurance of adequate food supply or the 
availability of food and the access to it (McClain-Nhlapo 2004). Money and food 
production are two ways of having access to food. The program tries to address this 
issue in a limited way. The point here is that DDRR went as far as increasing and 
building up the purchasing power of ex-combatants by given them money. They even 
distributed food rations to them. Although many academics and other practitioners do 
not welcome the ideal of rewarding of ex-combatants for doing wrong, but in a 
nutshell, they are not rewarded for doing wrong, but rather for them to desist from 
doing wrong through violent means (Muggah 2009). Again, this is just a short term 
solution, but the long term solution is the economic empowerment gained from 
vocational training and other forms of education or career building for future 
reference. Once there are jobs and stable incomes for the ex-combatants, food may 
likely be accessible. This is modern time where „money is the key medium of 
exchange of goods and services‟. Even those ex-combatants that choose to do 
agriculture, which will enable them to produce their own food, are complaining of 
inadequate finance. They will need other financial sources in order to kick-start or 
revive their farm projects before becoming self-reliance.     
 Health Security_ Health Security is the assurance of health services to protect 
individuals from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles (Hough 2008). Medical services 
were provided to ex-combatants during the DDR program in Liberia in order to make 
sure that ex-combatants enjoy healthy lives. Post- traumatic stress disorder, 
psychological effects and HIV/AIDS are the most common among ex-combatants, 
which reportedly left unattended due to the short time table (Pajibo 2005). Again since 
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DDRR program does not last longer, ex-combatants are charged with the 
responsibility to make use of the economic empowerment programs, which will in the 
long run provide jobs and income that will enable them tackle their health issues. 
 Environment Security_ Environmental Security is the assurance of the protection of 
individuals from ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of 
the natural environment (Hough 2008). This may not have a clear link to DDRR but it 
does in some instances. The natural resources were spared from further degradation 
and exploitation when the combatants were recruited for the DDRR program. The 
widespread illicit mining that fueled the Liberian conflict came to a halt as those 
combatants carrying on these illegal trade and transactions became participants of 
DDRR program. Logging companies operating illegally left the forest, sparing the 
habitat of wildlife and trees that are important in the reduction of CO2 (Time 
Magazine 2011). On the other hand, clean drinking water was provided to ex-
combatants during the program. They had access to safe drinking water instead of 
unsafe water from streams, rivers and water holes unsafe for human consumption. 
 Personal Security_ Personal Security is the assurance of the protection of individuals 
against violent crimes, from physical violence, whether from the state or external 
states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or from 
predatory adults (Jolly and Deepayan 2006). Combatants during DDRR process were 
well protected from physical violence and also the entire society was protected from 
the combatants when they were place in cantonment sites. This shows the importance 
of Personal Security. Ex-combatants are people too, and need protection just as the 
rest of the population. The locals that were terrorized during the conflict will like to 
revenge, which places the personal security of ex-combatants at risk. Mob justice is 
quite common in Liberia. In fact, many criminals, who are presumably to be ex-
combatants, are reported murdered by locals without state intervention or legal action 
taken. Ex-combatants encamped in cantonment sites had maximum security guarantee, 
but most of them considered it as a semi-prison and prefer going out. Female and child 
soldiers were given special care due to their vulnerability to male and commanding 
officers of their groups. Former sex-slave female soldiers and conscripted child 
soldiers‟ personal security was improved by separating them from their former 
commanders and their rapists. Personal Security for ex-combatants has been an issue 
of debate in Monrovia. Are ex-combatants victims or perpetrators? There is no clear 
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answer to this question because most of the interviewees said they were forcefully 
recruited or cleverly led to take arms. Considering such ex-combatant as a perpetrator 
will be a disservice and an unjust judgment. It will be wise to protect every ex-
combatant for the sake of restoring justice in an aftermath of gross human rights 
violation like the case of Liberia.    
 Community Security_ Community Security is the protection of individuals from the 
loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence. The 
Krahns fighting for retaining power and Gios fighting a revenge proxy war for the 
Americo-Liberian to come back to power. The two tribes violently destroyed each 
other‟s traditional relationships and values during the 14 years of the Liberian conflict. 
Those perpetrators were the combatants from both ethnicities. DDRR was used as an 
intervention measure to stop this community violence. When the DDRR program was 
rolled out in Liberia by early 2004, the destruction and killings were stopped (Pajibo 
2005). Ethnic tension is one of the major causes of violent conflict in the Liberia 
history. Respect for tradition came to a standstill during the war. Traditional sites of 
historical values were destroyed and desecrated.  
 Political Security_ Political Security is the assurance of the protection of individuals 
from basic human rights violations (Jolly and Deepayan 2006). Gross violations of 
basic human rights are often carried out during civil conflicts. Most dictatorial African 
governments and regimes believe that their protection lies with the political 
repression, systematic torture, disappearance or arbitrary arrest of oppositions 
(Carment and Schnabel, 2003). This has been the leading cause of the Liberia civil 
war. DDRR program created the foundation for peaceful settlement between rival 
groups. The 2003 National Transitional Government and the 2005 general elections 
would not have been held without the ground work that was carried out by DDRR 
through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Rebel 
leaders with political interest were encouraged to take the democratic trend by taking 
part in the National Transitional Government and the 2005 general elections. Their 
participation brought Political Security to them and their former fighters including the 
entire country. Studies show that whenever people are politically disfranchised, 
violent becomes an option for political participation (Youboty 2004). 
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Human Security is not the only remedy in reducing the periodic violence in the Liberian 
society. What we can say is that this approach to a wider extent helps the DDRR process to 
meet most of its objectives by providing most of the basic needs of the ex-combatants and 
their communities. 
3.3 Human Development  
Human Development is another normative approach to maintaining sustainable peace during 
the securitization of post-war state. There is no absolute security without development and 
there is no development without security (Collier, in Whitehall Report, 4-06). Human Security 
and Human Development are interdependent; therefore, the failure in one will lead to the 
failure of the other. This has been the most difficult part in teaming the two approaches. 
Human Development is a shared responsibility among DDRR, UNDP and other collaborating 
partners. The confusion of, „who to do what and when to do what‟, only undermines the 
DDRR program.  Yet still, amidst this tug of war, DDRR has managed one way another to 
perform some of its task. 
Human Development is the building of individual‟s capabilities by choice to enable self-
support (Welzel et al., 2003). It is a people-centre innovation to securitization. Human 
Development has four basic pillars; sustainability, production, equity and empowerment 
(UNDP 2011). To prove the relevance of Human Development to DDRR, we see these four 
components as basic link in securitizing post-conflict nations. DDRR strives toward the 
improvement of ex-combatants well being at both long and short term perspectives. Let us 
look at the overall concept of Human Development which is capacity building. The ex-
combatants and war affected people‟s capabilities to support their own lives through 
legitimate means is of paramount importance to DDRR. They should be the ones to decide 
what to do in life. DDRR gives varieties of choices, though not so convenient, but a bit 
meaningful to produce, sustain and empower the ex-fighters. The formal education and 
vocational schools offered during DDRR process are meant to increase chances of ex-fighters 
survival in postwar era in the long term. Education is a vital tool to Human Development, that 
is why the program really prioritized the education of ex-combatants, but majority of them did 
not take advantage of those offers to the end. Not that they do not want to, but it is because 
they do not have the will to go to school.  
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Politics has taken hold of the intended good will of DDRR in Liberia. For instance, there are 
about 8000 men and women of the disbanded Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) that were 
completely marginalized. They were excluded from the DDR program. These soldiers were 
only disarmed, but not demobilized neither participated in the reintegration exercise. They 
were instead given some cash money for their services rendered to Liberia.  
The confusion here is Charles Taylor‟s had his own army alongside AFL. During the DDRR 
process, Taylor‟s elite forces and the other two main rebel group took part while the AFL 
soldiers were left out, thinking that they are constituted army and should be retained or hugely 
compensated. However, they were only disarmed and layout from active military duties. The 
redundant soldiers were left in the cold not knowing what their future will be. This did not go 
down well with the AFL soldiers. Although, they were given about $540-3,000 each with 
certificates for serving their country, yet still they are requesting for more money and 
reinstatement to the newly formed AFL. 
The money given to the redundant soldiers has long been spent and they now have no means 
of earning to support themselves and their families. The capacity of these soldiers is yet to be 
built to increase their chances of survival. Human Development does not call for only cash 
donation but rather the combination of cash, education, and sustainable assistance that will 
lead to socio-economic empowerment. At the end result, Human Development growth brings 
smile to the faces of not only the ex-fighters but also the locals and that can help in stabilizing 
the security of the people and state. 
To further buttress my view of Human Development as a supporting concept to DDRR which 
can lead to perfect securitization of a post-war state or region, I would like to reflect back to 
the 1995-96 DDR program in Liberia. Due to the lack of adequate ingredients in improving 
Human Security and Human Development in the 1995 DDR program in Liberia the conflict 
further degenerated. Because the physical and mental disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of fighters were not prioritized, Liberia again was soon caught in the midst of 






3.4 Reconciliation   
Reconciliation is the most effective and acceptable mechanism in conflict resolution and 
conflict transformation (Beyond Intractability 2011). Where there is no true reconciliation, 
peace becomes elusive with a propensity to erupt into a violent conflict. This happened in 
1999; just two years after Charles Taylor won the 1997 general elections in Liberia and 
became president, fighting broke up again and lasted for four more years. Reconciliation has 
become a hitch in the struggle for lasting peace in Liberia. Reconciliation is the forgiveness 
and acceptance of perpetrator by the victim and vice versa (Aertsen et al. 2008). This 
approach really takes time, determination, courage and pure heart to be reached. Just little 
misstep, the entire conflict can start at fresh. 
Reconciliation amongst ex-combatants in Liberia has been relatively successful in the lower 
rink and file. Most of the low ranking ex-combatants were encamped alongside their former 
enemies during the DDRR program, which broke the divide and built confidence in accepting 
and forgiving each other. The leaders on the other hand are still justifying their role played in 
the conflict, making it much harder for true reconciliation between them to hold. Leaders of 
defunct warring factions, ex-combatants and locals are still confronting each other with 
resentments, threatening remakes and calling for retribution. Local communities are skeptical 
of ex-combatants, as ex-combatants feel discriminated against by the society.  
Education on reconciliation was not fully put to play during the DDRR process. 
Reconciliation is never archived with resentment and unforgiving (Potter 2006), but rather the 
human resilience to accept all pain for healing and reparation. This is now posing a serious 
security risk in Liberia. Reconciliation is a very complex issue in Liberia. The people are not 
sincere in reconciling their differences. Bitter pill has to be swallowed to change the already 
existing “negative peace” into durable “positive peace” that may otherwise soon turn into full 
scale violent conflict like in 1999.  
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (TRC) was charged with the 
responsibility of conducting thorough investigation in the Liberian civil conflict from 1980 to 
2003. This Commission was given legitimacy to come out with findings and 
recommendations in ensuring justice in the aftermath of the Liberia civil war that was 
characterized by gross human rights violation. The first draft of the Commission‟s final report 
was released in July 2009 which increased the buildup of political tension once again in 
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Liberia. The citizens were divided, some calling for absolute amnesty to be granted to 
everybody no matter what the role may have been during the Liberian crisis while others 
saying justice must be served through retributive justice (punishment for wrong doings). Even 
the current president, Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has not allowed the Commission‟s 
recommendation to come to effect. With these differences, reconciliation in Liberia has a long 
way to go.  
 
3.5 Summary 
Improvement of Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation are very relevant 
for the securitization of post-war nations during post-conflict reconstruction. The fear and 
possibility of slipping back into violent civil conflict is never ruled out during post-conflict 
reconstruction especially where the three concepts mentioned previously are not improved to 
acceptable standard. There is an increasing risk of insecurity in every Liberian community. 
The ex-combatants are in the constant habit of invading company‟s plant and private homes; 
stealing properties, extorting cash and armed robbing civilians, which even sometimes cause 
human fatality (Time Magazine 2011).  
The livelihoods of ex-combatant can be improved in a meaningful way through these concepts 
mainly for the stabilization of security in post-war areas that may threaten state or regional 
security. The motive of DDRR is to build the potentials of ex-combatants by changing them 
from armed bandits, soldiers and militias to lawful civilians. In achieving this, DDRR mainly 
builds and improves the capabilities of the ex-combatants in order to survive just as ordinary 
civilian. Options of returning to violence conflict are then reduced to the minimum through 
the employment of Human Security, Human Development and Reconciliation approaches. 
These approaches to securitization are costly and difficult to undertake, but once they are 












In this chapter, I will present and analyze data collected from 30 male former combatants that 
participated in the DDRR program in Liberia between 2003 and 2009. There are three 
sections in this chapter. Section one will cover the personal data of the 30 ex-combatants, 
section two will deal with their post-war lives mainly their (livelihoods), and section three 
will cover the reintegration issues. The living conditions of the ex-fighters and the way they 
sustain themselves economically as civilians will give a clue to the present insecurity in 
Liberia. It is important to note that the study is not seeking out the demerits of the Liberian 
DDR program, but rather to examine the cause of the huge unemployment and the lack of 
stable jobs amongst the ex-combatants, which has the propensity of undermining the national 








Age  Group Frequency Percentage 
19-24 5 17 
25-30 7 23 
31-36 12 40 
37-42 3 10 
43-48 2 7 
49-64 1 3 
Total  30 100 
Source: Fieldwork 2009 
 
Table 1 above shows the age range of the primary interviewees. From the table it is evident 
that over half of the ex-combatant interviewed was between the ages of 24 and 42, which 
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indicates that there are more working age men amongst them. If the 14 years of conflict is 
subtracted from each age in this table you will find out that most of the ex-combatants were 
children and young men prior to the war. 
  
Out of the total of the 30 men who were interviewed, 40% (12) formed the modal age group 
between the ages of 31 and 36. Second to the modal age group are ages from 25 to 30, 
constituted 23% of the respondents. Ages of 19 to 25 constituted 17%, while 10% of the 
respondents were between the ages of 37 and 42. This table shows that as the age increases all 
other variables decrease. Between ages 43 and 48, there is just 7%, and 3% for ages between 
49 and 64. 
 
Putting this data trend into context with regards to the research problems, it is proven that 
most of the ex-combatants are economically active. Most of the ex-combatants were young 
men with the energy and ambition to work, but lack of experience because age comes with 
experience and experience is one of the major factors of qualification in terms of employment 
in the Liberian society. With all their vocational training skills, it was difficult for them to get 
employed because most of them were young men with little or no working experience in the 
Liberian setting.  
 
 Table 2  
Educational Background 
Educational Background Frequency Percentage 
Elementary/Junior high Sch. 2 7 
Secondary (Senior high Sch.) 1 3 
Vocational Training School 14 47 
University/College 1 3 
Illiterate 12 40 
Total 30 100 
Source: Fieldwork 2009 
Table 2 shows above the education level of the respondents. The table shows that there is a 
relatively high illiteracy rate and nearly half of them have had some kind of skill training but 
this does not reflect the reality on the ground in terms of getting jobs from what they have 
learned. A very low number of them have reached upper high school and college while about 
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7% with lower education. The high illiteracy rate and low education level amongst the 
respondents is one of the leading factors to their unemployment. 
 
The table shows 47% of the 30 respondents completed DDR skill training, 40% have no 
formal educated, while 7% with primary education, 3% with secondary and 3% with college 
education. 
 
The table conveys low formal educational level amongst the respondents, but very high 
vocational training skill. On the contrary, the high rate of vocational training skills amongst 
the respondents does not reflect their employment. Even with these new skills, the ex-fighters 
are unfortunately the highest unemployed group of people in Monrovia. Therefore, one can 
say that their qualification for employment is not evaluated just on their skills alone, but from 
amongst other factors discussed below.  
 
 
Table 3  
Marital Status 
Marital Status Frequency Percentage 
Single/never Married/cohabit 2 7 
Cohabiting 12 40 
Married 9 30 
Separated 4 13 
Devoiced 2 7 
Widower 1 3 
Total 30 100 
Source: Fieldwork 2009 
 
Table 3 above shows the pattern of marital status. This table shows marital status of the ex-
combatants, with most having dependents and household members. The table shows that 
about 70% of the respondent has family, which means there is obligation for them to 
economically provide for their dependents. However, the remaining 30% may have not being 
in the category of married men, but have some extended family members living with them as 
dependents according to the below table 4. 
51 
 
The data trend shows 40% of the respondent were living together with women but not legally 
married. 30% were married either by civil or traditional marriage, 13% were separated from 
their spouses while 7% were single, 7% devoiced and 3% widower. 
 
From this table one can see that 70% of the respondent had one or more family member to 
provide for in terms of food, clothes, shelter and other basic human needs. These 
responsibilities are what driving the ex-fighters beyond the legal limit in search for daily 
bread. With these responsibilities, but no stable or permanent means of livelihood, one can 
say that they have little chance of upholding to the law.    
 
 Table 4 
4.3 Respondents’ Dependents 
Informant by ID# Number of children & spouse Number of other dependent 
#1 2 1 
#2 3 1 
#3 4 2 
#4 1 1 
#5 0 3 
#6 0 0 
#7 2 0 
#8 1 0 
#9 0 2 
#10 4 2 
#11 2 0 
#12 1 0 
#13 3 2 
#14 0 4 
#15 3 1 
#16 2 0 
#17 1 0 
#18 3 0 
#19 1 0 
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#20 2 4 
#21 2 1 
#22 0 2 
#23 2 3 
#24 3 2 
#25 0 0 
#26 3 4 
#27 4 2 
#28 3 4 
#29 5 1 
#30 2 3 
Total  59 45 
Source: Fieldwork 2009 
 
Table 4 above shows the family size of the respondents from zero to seven, which comprised 
of children, spouse, and extended family members. Although there were just 30 respondents 
that participated in the study, but their income is shared by dependents within their household. 
That alone puts extra economic responsibility on the ex-fighters who are mainly unstable 
income earners.   
 
Unlike the nuclear family structure mostly found in the Western countries, most Liberian 
households are considered to be extended. It is culturally acceptable for cousins, nephews, 
uncles, aunties, brothers, sisters, parents and, grandparents to be member of a household as 
dependents (Liberiansown).  
Some of the respondents even have foster children living with them under these struggling 
conditions. As respondent #28 puts it, “it makes sense to live as a large family because we all 
put together our little daily earnings to cook a big evening dish for all of us to eat together as 
family”.  Living together in an extended family structure builds strong and lasting connection 
amongst members of the family, and most importantly helps to overcome economic and social 
hardships, which otherwise an individual could not have done alone especially in post war 
affected nation like Liberia.   
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Respondent #14 is just 20 years and his father was killed by some militias in 2002. He now 
lives along with his mother, two sisters and a brother. He said “although I am an adult but 
living with my mother makes me happy and stronger because I have someone as a role model 
and who will stand for me always”.  In Liberia, a 20 year old is formally considered as adult, 
but traditionally 20 years old is like a child who still heavily depends on the parents for nearly 
everything.   
 
4.4 Living Arrangements 
It was recorded that ex-combatants and their families were given temporary accommodation 
during the disarmament period at cantonment sites according to UNDP, but accommodation 
was not included in the resettlement package. The ex-combatants thus had to find their own 
accommodation. It was easy for those that took rural communities to settle in because 
building or renting hunts was relatively affordable those areas. However, those that choose to 
live in Monrovia faced exorbitant rent and the general high cost of living. 
 
As explained by respondent #25, “We are sleeping in the streets of Monrovia. Some of us 
sleep in old cars, abandon buildings, unfinished houses and under market tables and bridges. 
Let the people help us for God‟s sake”. He further asked me whether $150 could build a house 
in this modern time.  
 
According to respondent #25, who is involved in building construction, “ex-fighters that were 
resettled in the rural areas had advantage in getting good accommodation from their host 
communities because those communities in the interior needed people to live in their deserted 
towns and villages in order to bring back human presence”. That was not in the case of most 
of my informants in Monrovia. Their point of argument was that not every ex-fighter will live 
in rural Liberia just for better housing, what they really need is stable job and better income. 
They can find better house to rent when they have stable and better pay jobs. In fact, the rural 
areas have no social-economic and developmental activities going on in those rural 
settlements and communities. “There is no life in the interior; no job is there, commercial 
goods are very expensive, no good car roads, going to live there is like going back to 
primitive life. This is why you are seeing most of us taking the chance of surviving the hard 




I visited respondent #13 and his family in Dwazohn, Robert‟s Field Highway. As for him, he 
owns a half plot of land that he bought for himself after receiving his AFL demobilization 
package. He also built a house with 3 bedrooms. He said, “I am not a former rebel but rather 
former soldier of the regular national army (AFL). We were redundant from the AFL and 
given a token for our service which I have used wisely for me and my family to have a place to 
call our own home”. 
 
Respondents #4, #8, #9, #11, #12, #19 are all unskilled worker and live in a zinc house with 
two rooms cut by partition inside at ELWA Junction in Monrovia. The men pay a monthly 
rent of 500 Liberian dollars which is equivalent to about $8 per month. “I think we are doing 
ok here despite the over crowdedness of the house and lack of privacy. We do not have 
permanent jobs to rent apartments like other people, though we do not like how we live here, 
but we just have to cope with living this way for now. Some of our friends have nowhere to 
sleep.” those were words of respondent #19.  
 
The DDR program did not actually provide permanent homes for the ex-combatants which 
resulted into a great setback in reintegrating them in their chosen communities. Most 
communities in rural Liberia are not easily accessible because of the bad road networks, 
making lives there unattractive. Rural life style in Liberia mainly involves farming, which 
most ex-combatants consider unattractive and thereby explaining eagerness to settle in urban 
areas. 
 
Roads leading from Monrovia to Lofa, Maryland, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, Gbapolu, and 
River Cess counties are in deplorable conditions for vehicles to travel on. “Sometimes for 
months, cars don‟t travel on these roads especially during rainy season that is why everybody 
wants to live in Monrovia where things are quite better,” according to respondent #3, who is 
resident of Red Light in Monrovia and a taxi driver.  
 
Crowded up ghettos, large market places, and deserted buildings are affordable homes for 
some of the respondents interviewed. Respondent #29 who is a middle age man and a block 
layer told me “we don‟t have choice; we just want some where to sleep instead of wondering 
up and down in the streets of Monrovia. The money they give us cannot buy land and build a 
house at the same time”.  Actually a piece of land (an acre) in Liberia cost about $100-$3,000 
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depending on the location. Building house with 2 to 3 bed rooms is about $1,000-$20,000 
depending also on the type of house. Mixed shape mat, earth-bricks and all- round-zinc 
houses can cost you about $3000-$7,000 while modern cement concrete bricks house will cost 
about $8,000-$20,000, according to respondent #27, who is also a DDR trained mason.        
  
Section Two  
 
4.5 DDR Vocational Training Programs 
 
The DDR program was overwhelmed the day the first part payment of the $300 incentive 
allowance was given to each disarmed and demobilized fighter. From that moment the 
reintegration face of the DDR program began.  
Besides the cash money offered to the combatants there were series of other educational and 
vocational training programs that were available according to NCDDRR. Those programs 
were as follows: 




5. Hair dressing 
6. Building construction (small homes) 
7. Masonry  
8. Plumbing 
9. Mechanic  
10. Small farming 
 
Only seven (23%) of the 30 respondents were able to earn some income from jobs that they 
were trained. While 23 (77%) found themselves doing something quite different from what 
they were trained for and were compelled to combine jobs just to earn enough money. 
Respondent #30 said he was trained as a mechanic, but now he is a commercial taxi driver 




There were lots of programs conducted by other NGOs in collaboration with DDR during the 
skills training section of the DDR program. Agricultural skills like food crops farming, small 
businesses and other creative skills training were introduced to boost the capacity of ex-
combatants. However, some of the ex-fighters took advantage of these programs and today 
utilizing their skills to earn their living while most of them have no means of putting their 
training skills to use. 
  
4.6 Income Generating Activities 
 
United Nations and international donors spent millions of dollars on the DDR program in 
Liberia to assure genuine security upon which development, political and social-economic 
planning can take the stage (Pajibo 2005). In this venture, education and vocational training 
opportunities were offered to ex-combatants in order for them to be qualified for future jobs. 
The data shows that getting education or Job training was one thing and getting a place on the 
job market was another. There is a huge negative mindset surrounding ex-combatants in 
Liberia up to present where locals and employers do not trust the ex-combatants for 
employing them. Findings from the research as shown in table 4 proves that DDR skill 
trainings really backfired because of the lack of  actual job placement, and career guidance for 
ex-fighters causing more problems for the reintegration of ex-combatants in general. 
 
Trained as mechanic but turned Taxi driver:  
Trained as mechanic but now a taxi driver; according to respondent #30, he was trained as 
mechanic, but at the end he found himself being a taxi driver. This was one of his statements 
during the interview: 
“That is life; I just have to join the struggle with my friends and hope for better future but my 
story can prove that the people (DDR) wasted our time and money. They cannot negotiate for 
jobs that we were trained for but rather dashing without real jobs to support our families. 
How can you blame those carrying on armed robberies when there is no other alternative for 
them? Not everybody can withstand hardship, especially this humiliating situation we find 
ourselves in”.      
The hundreds of dollars spent for his mechanic training could have been used to send ten ex-
fighters through a driving school and get a driver license and even second hand car (sedan) to 
run as taxi. The respondent further said, “some of our friends are three drivers to one taxi or 
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two to one motorbike and they change shift which allow them to do other jobs on the side to 
enable them earn more money.” 
 
In order to build the human security and human resource of the ex-combatants more options 
should have been considered to avoid the ex-fighters from getting back in the streets with 
violence or crossing over to Ivory Coast to fight in hope of benefitting from the spoils of war 
as report by local Liberian news papers.  
 
If these extra activities were immediately adopted into the action plan of DDR it would have 
been hugely impacted the lives of ex-combatants on a positive note, saved lot of money and 
improved the overall security of the state.     
 
Student but turned motorbike-taxi man:  
Respondent #16 told me that he was sent to high school, but decided to sell his school coupon 
and find something else to do. According to him “ I am getting old, there are lots of things 
going on in my life now so I just want to start earning money to help my children go to school 
instead of me”. When I asked him why he sold his school coupon, he then responded like this: 
I sold the coupon to buy motorbike to run as commercial transportation in order to support 
my children. They give us about $30 per month and pay tuition and fees which is pretty close 
to about $600 per year. So when I am offered about $800 for the coupon that is valid for three 
school years, it is enough to buy me one motorbike that will give me a daily income of about 
$30, which is thirty times more than the monthly allowance given me for the back to school 
program. You are the book man so just do the simple math”. 
 
The jobs of most of the respondents are not stable or permanent; they range from casual daily 
laborer jobs (unskilled part-time jobs) to professional driver and block layers. Most of the jobs 
are not stable; today one ex-fighter may find himself brushing roadside and the next week 
selling cold water or farming.  “Most employers are afraid to hire ex-combatants as 
carpenter, plumber or house constructor because equipments and material get missing when 
they are employed,” that was a respond from one DDR official. 
 
Trained for general building construction but turned block molder: 
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Respondent #1 who was trained for general building construction is now a block molder. 
When asked about the dramatic change of career plan this was his response: 
“Well, it is disappointing to see myself molding blocks for a living when trained to build 
house and things like that. I am just tire complaining because it is like a losing battle, nobody 
is willing to listen or help us. When they hear the word „Ex-combatant‟ it sounds like Satan to 
them. So we just have to keep out of trouble and accept what God has for us”.    
 
These changes between job trained for and jobs occupied presently is very common amongst 
the ex-combatants. Some were trained as small farmers but they sold their tools and seeds to 
other farmers just to end up mining sand or loading public transport at Red Light, Water Side, 
ELWA Junction, Johnson Street, Broad Street and Duala Market. This job has no stable 
income so the day an ex-combatant finds no contract as car conductor; he is possibly tempted 
to steal or engage in criminal activities in order to provide food for his family. Though none 
of the respondents admitted of being involved in armed robbery or criminal activities, but 
with the present socio-economic situation couple with high unemployment in Monrovia it 
becomes a wonder how some of these ex-combatants provide food for they and their families.       
 
 
4.7 Informants by Income Generating Activities 
 
Table 5 below summarizes the income generating activities of the ex-combatants, and the 
occupational definitions.  
 
Block molding comprise of the molding and selling of concrete blocks used in building 
construction. 
Taxi driver is one who drives a taxi cab for commercial purpose. 
Motorbike taxi is to move commuters from point A to point B on motorbike for a fee. 
Conductor at parking is an individual who finds passengers for taxi/buses for a commission. 
Sand wining is the wining, selling and transportation of sand for building construction.  
Casual laborer is one who can do any kind of odd job that requires no formal training. 
Building construction comprise of the building of small homes, houses, carpentry work, 
block laying and masonry work. It also includes working as assistant at building sites. 
O comprise of seasonal contractors. 
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#1 X        
#2 X    X  X  
#3  X       
#4    X  X   
#5   X      
#6 X    X  X  
#7   X      
#8    X X X   
#9 X   X  X   
#10  X       
#11    X X X   
#12    X X X   
#13 X      X  
#14 X    X X   
#15  X       
#16   X      
#17    X X X   
#18   X      
#19 X     X   
#20    X  X   
#21   X      
#22   X      
#23 X      X  
#24        X 
#25       X  
#26        X 
#27       X  
#28 X      X  
#29 X      X  
#30  X       
Source: Fieldwork 2009 
Table 5 above also shows dramatic changes in skill training courses offered by DDR 
vocational training schools with regards to the current jobs being occupied by the ex-fighters. 
Most of the respondents took on livelihoods (jobs) that were not part of the DDR training 
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program just to fill in the unemployment gap and most of these jobs are seasonal or unstable. 
When some were asked about these changes respondent #16 responded by saying, “we do not 
have to know book to drive motorbike or taxi, it only takes determination and willing heart to 
do what we do”. Some combined jobs in order to increase their income that will be enough to 
sustain them and their families. 
  
Just like the unstable jobs, incomes of some respondents are also unstable and not fixed. Even 
the taxi and motorbike (Pem-Pem) drivers are not certain about their income, but at the end of 
their daily work, they expect something lucrative as compared to most unskilled ex-
combatants. Despite the little economic boom being experienced today in Liberia, over half of 
its population lives on less than a dollar a day. The economic growth is in no way reflecting 
the livelihoods of the common people in Liberia among whom you find large portion of the 
ex-combatants population. 
 
UNDP index on income reveals that each Liberian earns about $500 per year with regards to 
the country GDP and per capital income, but in reality it is one out of every 100 that earn such 
income per year. 
 
Below is data from the field showing details explanation of table 5 which shows jobs and 
earnings of respondents. The then exchange rate was $1=70 Liberian dollars: 
 Taxi driver……………………………earns about 1,000 Liberian dollars per day ($15) 
 Mini Motorbike (Pem-Pem)………….earns about 2,000 Liberian dollars per day ($30) 
 Daily unskilled laborer…………earnings range from 50 to 300 Liberian dollars per 
day ($0.70 to $4) 
 Skilled laborer (carpenter, mechanic ect)……earnings range from 2,000 to 10,000 
Liberian dollars per month ($30 to 143)   
 
From the incomes shown above, we now know why DDR prioritized vocational skill training 
for the ex-combatants. The DDR strategists felt by training ex-fighters in these areas they (ex-
combatants) would have found permanent employment with lucrative wages, but that was not 
the case. It became difficult to have the ex-combatants employed despite their vocational 
training qualifications and certificates. The mini motorbike drivers have become one of the 
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leading income earners amongst the respondents and this was not part of the DDR training 
program.  
 
The social-economic and cultural settings of the ex-combatants were not examined thoroughly 
before DDR could consider the kind of programs for the ex-fighters. It seems like these 
programs were directly or indirectly imposed on the ex-fighters without considering other 
options and alternatives like mini motorbike, public transport conductor for taxi/buses and 
driver license for ex-combatants to operate taxi and motorbike taxi. 
Section Three 
 
4.8 Acceptance and Forgiveness 
 
The rate of acceptance and forgiveness is very low between the ex-combatants and the local 
communities in Liberia, which poses threat to the employment of the ex-fighters by local 
employers. Acceptance and forgiveness are the core ingredients for absolute reconciliation 
and ex-combatants cannot be reintegrated in any community without resolving these issues 
(Skaar 2005). 
 
Because of the lack of acceptance and forgiveness, the ex-fighters are finding it difficult to be 
hired or employed by local employers and without jobs the means to support their livelihoods 
is at stake. The bitterness and resentment are so high to the extent that the ex-fighters are 
being dehumanized in many communities by locals. The rage for retribution against ex-
combatants is so high to the extent that most landlords and employers are not willing to accept 
them in some quarters, which has also contributed towards their unemployment and lack of 
sustainable livelihoods. Communities and locals are extending little forgiveness to ex-
combatants rather than to forgive sincerely.  
 
This is how a 19 year old respondent #5 puts it: 
We are human too despite what may have happened in the past years. Are we now the bad 
guys? No, we are not. We considered ourselves to be victims too, they used us to fight. I was 
forcibly conscripted into Charles Taylor‟s militias at the age of 8, drugged on a daily bases 
and indoctrinated into African Vulu. Would you considered me as the bad guy here? I don‟t 
think you can because you know better. There are many Liberians who just think that once 
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you are a former combatant you deserve not to live. If every ex-combatant is imprisoned or 
executed today in Liberia will that bring peace? I don‟t think so.   
Some of my friends were murdered in cold blood by angry mobs because they were accused of 
being armed robbers. Of all the school and vocational training we went to, they don‟t want to 
give us their jobs. No body to stand and speak for us so we are just living by the grace of God. 
   
In the aftermath of violent conflict were gross human rights abuse and other forms of war 
related maltreatment were carried out, true reconciliation becomes difficult, but not 
impossible. In reality, it is hard to forgive anybody who killed your parents for no justifiable 
reason, but for the sake of peace and putting to an end circular violence it is a noble thing to 
forgive your perpetrator. Due to vengeance, Liberia was slowly dragged into 14 years of civil 
conflict and today it is realized now that payback (retribution) has been the greatest mistake 
ever in the history of Liberia. Issues that should have been dealt with peacefully with 
amicable solution were degenerated into large civil crisis that destroyed the entire country. I 
don‟t think diplomacy is cowardice but rather a nexus between the peaceful coexistence and 
national solidarity of the suppressed and suppresser.      
 
 
4.9 Political reintegration 
 
Political reintegration is important for the personal security of ex-fighters. The participation of 
ex-fighters in political activities can pave the way for reintegration and gives ex-fighters a 
sense of belongingness and goal fulfillment (Zeeuw 2008). The conflict was driven by 
political and social-economic injustices; therefore, political reintegration of ex-fighters gives 
room for more employment opportunities and a new start for peace. 
 
Most of the respondents are affiliated with political parties in Liberia. From newly formed 
Congress for Democratic Change to National Patriotic Party of Liberia and the ruling party 
Unity Party, there are ex-combatants making up the grass root members of those parties. 
Some ex-general from warring parties are senators, representatives, ministers and directors in 
the present government who have become personal contacts for recommending qualified ex-




I talked to one former general from one of the warring factions about the political connection 
between the ex-fighters and political parties. For political reason he told me not to mention his 
name. He then explained like this: 
The former combatants see us who are in government as their representatives. Majority of 
them are registered members of political parties in Liberia. They are the foot soldiers 
(campaigner) for most of the political parties in Liberia. 
I am always reminding them when they come to my office that the revolution (war) is over and 
they should find better things to do with their lives. At first I never wanted to encourage them 
by giving them money, but they are like brothers now so it is like an obligation to me. I give 
them food and small pocket-change (small cash money) at least for them to take home to their 
families too.    
Not all of them were lucky to find job after their vocational training so you cannot blame 
them for everything you see or hear about them today. I think democracy is about the rich 
helping the poor to become rich too so since they have nothing doing now, let us that have the 
means help them to get on their feet. I think when we help them the security problem 
nowadays will improve. 
 
The political reintegration is by far the most successful type of reintegration in Liberia. It 
gives back to the ex-combatants political security, which protects individuals from basic 
human rights violations (Jolly and Deepayan 2006). Former warlords are given the authority 
to express their political franchise through the ballot box. Ex-soldiers are free to register to 
cast their vote for whosoever they want. If this freedom was extended beyond every line of 
security indicators, the Liberian security today would have been better than what it is.  
 
4.10 Socio-economic reintegration 
 
Socio-economic reintegration refers to all factors surrounding the social and economic status 
of ex-combatants in postwar Liberia. The lack of work makes it harder for socio-economic 
reintegration to hold because it undermines the active participation of ex-fighters into societal 
development. It was discovered by this study that key factors that curve socio-economic 
upwards are lacking making the lives of most of the respondents to be difficult. It is important 
for the ex-fighters to be active member of society through stable work and participation in 
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community activities (Castillo 2008). This will give them a sense of responsibility, trust and 
confidence in becoming good citizens once again, which will promote stable peace. 
 
Because of stereotyping, the ex-fighters are even finding it hard to interact with people in 
their local communities, and in so doing, making them to live in their own self-created world. 
Most residents are stereotyping the ex-fighters and avoiding them in many ways. Soft spoken 
respondent #27 explains: 
 “I and three of my colleagues completed our training in masonry. Everybody is afraid of us 
to give us contract, thinking that we will not do their work well or we will steal the materials. 
We are now making bricks and it is paying off a little which is better than nothing. Not every 
one of us can bear this hardship that is why you see armed robbers all over the place hustling 
their way out of this suffering”.  
        
The economy of Liberia is though recovering but at a relatively low pace. Postwar may be a 
good alibi for the slow pace in recovery coupled with global financial crisis. Whatever 
excuses the DDR authority and the Liberian government may have, there are yet more 
questions to be asked surrounding the poor impact the DDR program have had on ex-
combatant‟s lives. There were lots of policy alternatives and other options but they were not 
considered. Not to say there was no money for the program; millions of dollars was pumped 
into the DDR program in Liberia that could have pulled out better results (Pajibo 2005). But 
until the ex-combatants can have better livelihoods, there is no doubt for one to say that the 




As I summarize issues in this chapter, let me once again point out the relevant of the three 
concepts used to support the theory of securitization in postwar reconstruction and how their 
absence or limited usage has caused huge problems, which may undermine the security of 
Liberia. The huge unemployment of the ex-combatants is giving raise to the persistence 
violence in Liberia and beyond its borders. The human security and human development of 
most of the respondents was never improved sending them back to square one of the hard 
struggle of survival. The decline in donor support has resulted in the abrupt end of many DDR 
programs (Liberia DDRR).  
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 Communities and locals are reluctant to accept and forgive the ex-fighters due to lack of 
trust, while true reconciliation between the locals and ex-fighters has not yet improved. Due 
to the little or no education of the ex-combatants, human development indicators such as 
capacity building and skill training offered by the DDR didn‟t change their living conditions 
neither improve their lives because most of them have no stable jobs. Most of them do not 
have the educational foundation to continue vocational schools training.  
 
With the limited implementations of the three concepts during the postwar reconstruction of 
Liberia, a return to circular violence is imminent as thousands of ex-combatants hoping that 
their days of ruling with guns will return again soon. The unemployment has driven some ex-
combatants across the borders to the Ivory Coast to join the fighting there in hope of getting 





















Chapter 5:    Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
5.1 Summary  
This chapter presents a summary of the study, especially the background issues, problems and 
main findings. It also offers a set of ideas towards enhancing livelihoods of ex-fighters and 
develop DDR program. 
 
The study puts forth three relevant concepts (Human Security, Human Development and 
Reconciliation) that when injected into DDR initiative fully to the letter, the problems of 
criminal violence, risk of recurrence of war and insecurity in the aftermath of war could be 
prevented or minimized to a relatively low. After exploring the livelihoods of the Liberian ex-
combatants, it was discovered that these concepts were although delivered by the Liberian 
DDRR initiative, but not effectively and efficiently. This has led to the unemployment of 
many ex-fighters, which poses threats in undermining the national security of Liberia. To 
prove right my findings, ex-combatants are now taking on to the streets and communities of 
Liberia wagging havoc on peaceful citizens to find their daily bread. Some of them are being 
recruited as mercenaries in nearing Ivory Coast currently.  
 
Majority of the respondents said they never had stable job since their completion of DDRR 
training programs. These are just some of the few loopholes found in the DDR program. Why 
should the Liberian DDRR be considered a success story in the first place, when the 
reintegration of the primary subjects (ex-combatants) now finding it difficult to fully 
reintegrate into the Liberian society? Though some of the ex-fighters are enjoying the fruit of 
the DDRR and are said to be reintegrated in communities, but there are considerable number 
of them who say they are being discriminated by locals. The direct and indirect denial of the 
ex-fighters for equal job opportunity; short timeframe for the reintegration process, lack of 
active and long term institutions to run the affairs of ex-combatants including the lack of 
sincerity in the forgiveness of the ex-fighters, couple with donor fatigue and lack of political 
will are all major causes of the failure of the reintegration of the Liberian ex-combatants.   
 
Reintegration is a complicated concept that can be interpreted based on different perspectives. 
For example, from a layman point of view, reintegration will be considered as one returning 
back to their normal livelihood after an interruption by crisis like war and disaster. From DDR 
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perspective, reintegration is about transforming fighters into law abiding people who will 
once again live normal lives just like the ordinary people in their communities (Muggah 
2009).  DDR‟s reintegration goes beyond just the return of ex-fighters to their past normal 
lives; it mainly focuses on the stability of state security by providing the means through which 
basic needs and services can be easily accessed by ex-fighters, which as the result will 
discourage ex-fighters from going back to unlawful and subversive acts. 
  
The process through which “ex-combatants are reintegrated into the society and helped to 
develop legitimate alternative income-generating activities so they can provide for themselves 
and their family is the key indicator upon which the success of the DDR can be measure (De 
Zeeuw 2008). DDR will not be considered successful if war starts again few months after 
completing DDR program in a country or if ex-combatants resurface on war front in other 
country or elsewhere. 
 
I think reintegration is  practically a continue undertaking as buttressed by De Zeeuw in his 
argument saying “the reintegration part of the DDR process takes a long time and generally 
receives little attention” (De Zeeuw 2008:13). The effort and strategy needed to reintegrate an 
eighteen year old former combatant will not be the same as reintegrating a thirty year old 
returnee refugee. Most of if not all of the Liberian ex-fighters may have experienced violence 
directly or indirectly. The exposure to such gruesome violence has psychological impact on 
their future behavior, and that need special attention. This makes reintegration through the 
DDR perspective the best remedy for stabilizing post-war countries. 
 
The livelihoods of the ex-fighters in Liberia such as access to stable jobs and housing facility 
are not amicably addressed; putting them (ex-combatants) to square one of the human 
suffering that was one of the major causes of the Liberian civil war. Though it is unacceptable 
in modern society to use violence as the means to react to political and socio-economic 
injustices, but in Sub-Saharan countries where these injustices perpetuate by unbreakable and 
well structured ruling elites, there will always be people to rise against these kinds of 
structural violence even if violence means is the only option (Collier, Anke & Dominic 2009).  
 
Findings from the study were documented from answers during the research footwork. The 
first question was asked about the main focus of the DDR program in Liberian. Why the DDR 
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was heavily focused on short term goals of security (disarmament and demobilization) and not 
on the long term sustainable livelihoods of the program main subject (ex-combatants). From 
the study, it was discovered that long term reintegration plans for the ex-combatants were not 
properly tackled. 
 
The DDR program was implemented in a hurry, without any long term plan. After providing 
the ex-combatants with skills training, they were immediately discharged into communities to 
start life without any re-insertion guideline. The reintegration phase which is the most 
important part of sustainable security and development was abandoned leaving thousands of 
fighter‟s lives in bleak. Did the DDR program provide vocational training for the ex-
combatants? Yes, but most of the skills obtained from the training programs were not put to 
use by the ex-combatants. As a result, many ex-combatants were driven into unemployment, 
which undermines the postwar security in Liberia. 
 
The socio-economic dynamic of the ex-combatants was never considered. DDR officials 
randomly draw out projects that were not compatible with the previous or future earning 
capacity of ex-fighters as a result most ex-combatants did not find jobs for what they were 
trained for. For the question of reconciliation, it has not been an easy road for the ex-
combatants. They are still faced with retributions from many locals and communities in 
Monrovia. Most of them have become victims of mob justice, resulting in injuries and death 
without any proper redress or investigation by the government.  
 
When the ex-combatants were asked about their views on the DDR program, most of them 
responded negatively. Respondent 14 puts it this way, “they failed us, fooled us with lies and 
false promises, but let them pray for nothing bad to happen here again because as for me I 
won‟t listen to anybody this time if war comes again”. If the DDR officials are mainly concern 
about collecting weapons from the fighter without concentrating on the factors that led to the 
people taking those weapons in the first place, they get it wrong because the possibility of 
rearming and causing chaos still exist. The DDR program main subject (ex-fighters) has no 
security guarantee, putting them in a vulnerable position to do whatever it might take to be 




Most respondents concluded by saying they are waiting to see the outcome of the coming 
2011 general elections in Liberia. Their point was there is high possibility for renew fighting 
after the elections if the wrong presidential candidate wins and United Nations troops are 
withdrawn. Their argument is based on the fact that Liberia has a violent history where 
previous dissatisfaction in elections results has led to civil crisis. Samuel Doe‟s controversial 
victory in 1985 presidential elections and Charles Taylor‟s 1997 landslide victory are all good 
examples. This is why the UN still has troops in Liberia up to date in order to prevent such 
circular violence. The Liberian DDR program that should have level the playing field for 
security boom has failed, leaving UN with no other choice but to keep thousands of military 
and paramilitary officers on the ground indefinitely.      
 
5.2 Concluding Remarks  
 
As I compile the findings of this research, it is very important to put forth some 
recommendations that will enhance the livelihoods of ex-combatants during post-war 
reconstruction. I am not trying to suggest that these are the best recommendations to affect 
DDR initiative during peace building in post-war society, but they may have some significant 
contribution in reducing post-war violence, circular conflict and threat of insecurity. This is 
just an opportunity to give my view on how best the DDR program can improve the well 
being of ex-combatant‟s livelihood, and give them meaningful lives in order to narrow down 
criminality and insecurity in the aftermath of war in the future. 
 
This study puts forth the following recommendations:  
 
1. Adequate fund to run DDR is a major aspect of making the program successful. Let 
every donor, UN and government pledging financial support to DDR programs live up 
to their promises. DDR objectives cannot be fulfilled without enough money and 
support. The indefinite operational time couple with some unforeseen events down the 
line has made the undertaking of DDR initiatives very costly and lengthy, therefore, 
those giving their financial commitment should think well enough before making 




2. Stable and permanent jobs for ex-combatants. Unemployment itself is a crisis; 
therefore, the state should give tax reduction to companies that will give permanent 
employment to ex-combatants. This will be an encouraging factor for huge 
employment opportunity for ex-soldiers since most employers believe that employing 
ex-fighters is risk to their businesses and line of work.  
3. Financial institutions should prioritize giving grant and loan with low interest rate 
and long repayment term to potential entrepreneurs with agreement of employing ex 
number of former fighters. Small businesses and companies are the leading employers 
in growing economy today, therefore donor countries should prioritize the giving of 
loans and grants to private owned Liberian companies with the potential of low capital 
flight and that envisioned sustainable development aiming at employing both skilled 
and unskilled workers. We can see today the likes of Rwanda and Angola as excellent 
examples.   
 
4. Permanent institution should be established to run the affairs of ex-combatants 
during post-war reconstruction. DDR strategists and the state should constitute 
national institution that will provide long term personal assistant for every ex-
combatant until he/she is fully reintegrated into society. Graduating ex-fighters from 
DDR vocational schools alone cannot guarantee their reintegration and permanent 
employment. 
  
They will need guidance throughout until they are fully reintegrated since 
reintegration itself is a continuous long term process. For instance, about 100 ex-
combatants to one specialized consultant will be a good start. The consultant will be 
the contact person serving as character guarantor, career path finder and negotiator 
(agent). The assistant will send progress report for each ex-combatant quarterly and 
assist them in finding job as well. Just the how refugees and asylum seekers are 
integrated into the Norwegian society with personal assistant, who serves as a guide 
until a refugee is fully integrated.  
  
5. True reconciliation amongst ex-combatants and locals should be of paramount 
importance. Again, the state in collaboration with UN and other donors should offer 
compensation to communities that will willingly accommodate ex-combatants. Some 
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kind of settlement or compensation should be given to direct war victims that will 
encourage forgiveness and acceptance. The media should be used as a vital too 
through which community educational awareness on true reconciliation can be 
thought.  
 
6. Sustainable entrepreneurship should be a key priority for the ex-combatants training 
and job placement initiative. The establishments of companies like (taxi, motorbike-
taxi, sand wining, block molding, agriculture and other small and medium size 
businesses are ideal for job allocation for many ex-combatants. These small start-up 
companies can provide thousands of new jobs not only for ex-combatants, but also to 
other unemployed citizens. 
    
7.  A permanent small size UN or ECOWAS deterrent force should be deployed with a 
robust mandate to prevent war and protect civilians by intervening at a short notice 
and enforcing the peace when necessary. This deterrent force can also continue the 
training of the new national army and other security apparatus.  
 
The presence of such a deterrent force will send a strong signal to future would be 
trouble makers that there is a bigger and stronger military force to reckon with. This 
will also help to discourage the repeated formation of rebels and armed groups in 
Liberia and West Africa at large. Because they will know that victory through ballot 
instead of bullet is the only acceptable way of coming to power in this time of modern 
democracy.  
When all these points are carefully evaluated and adopted by UN, state governments, donors 
and other implementing partners that are engaged in post-war reconstruction work; lasting 
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All the interviews in this paper were conducted under confidentiality agreement between me 
and the interviewees for security, political and personal reasons. All the interviews were done 
in Monrovia, Liberia. My primary informants were from MODEL, LURD and 




Due to the confidentiality agreement between me and the respondents, I was unable to 
mention the direct names of the respondents. However, a list showing their names, factions 
and ranks has been given to the evaluation committee separately since this paper will be 
published for public view in the near future. Revealing their names could make them targets 












Appendix II: Interview Guide for Ex-combatants 
 
The interview guide was used to solicit views of the principal respondents and facility focus 
groups discussion. 
A. Background/Personal Information  
1. What is your name? 
2. How old are you? 
3. What is your marital status? 
4. What is your level of education? 
5. What is your current occupation? 
6. What is your parental status? 
7. How many dependants do you have? 
8. How many close family members do you have alive? 
9. In terms of rural and urban dweller, who are you? 
10. Which former belligerent group you were member of? 
11. What was your rank/position in the belligerent group? 
12. How long did you fight for your belligerent group(s)? 
   
B. The DDR Program   
13.  Did you participate in the DDR program? 
14. Which programs did you participate in? 
15.  Is your training from the DDR program beneficial to your reintegration? 
16.  Have you found job from what you were trained for? 
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17. What was/is your expectation from the DDR program with respect to sustainable 
livelihood? 
18.  Are you satisfied with the training options offered by the DDR? 
19.  What are you doing for a living presently? 
20.  What are the sources of your income/living? 
21.  If you were asked to grade the DDR program, what percentage would you award the 
Program?  
22.  Did the DDR program help in giving you a meaningful life today in Liberia? Explain! 
23. From your personal point of view, how your life would have been without DDR 
intervention through its training programs? 
24.  Did the DDR meet your expectation? 
25. What are your views on the DDR program?  
 
C. Social-Economic Reintegration 
26. Are you living in the same community as you were before the war? If yes why? 
27.  Do you face problem in gaining acceptance/forgiveness from your neighbors/community? 
If yes why? 
28. Who do you spend most of your free time with? Why? 
29. In your opinion, what is the perception of the ordinary Liberian towards you as ex-
combatants? 
 
D. Security and Peacekeeping  
 30.  Are you satisfied with the present security situation in Liberia? 
 31.  Does the presence of UN peacekeepers gives strong security guarantee?  
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32.   Can the Liberian people depend on the national police and army for security? 
33.   What the security condition will be like if the UN peacekeepers leave Liberia? 
34.  Why crime is on the increase in Liberia nowadays? 
35.  Would you accept the results of the coming 2011 general elections? Why? 
36.  If there should be war in Liberia again, will you join a militia group again? If yes, why? 
37.  If the present Liberia government wants to recruit you for any of the security agency    
(i.e. army and police), will you accept the offer?  
 
E. Personal Views, Comments and Suggestions on Human Security, Development 
and Reconciliation in Liberia   
38. Four hours of open group discussion as respondents present comments, views and 
suggestions on the human security, development and reconciliation of ex-combatants in 
Liberia. Remarks of how to improve job opportunities that can provide better sustainable 
livelihoods for the ex-fighters finalized our discussion.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
